German Revolution

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October, 1917 was followed by German Revolutions. They were intended to be parts of a world revolution, a total take over, a New World Order. Interestingly the Kriegsmarine, the German navy mutinied on 9 November, two days before the official end of World War I Players include Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht and the Communist Party of Germany. The communist revolutions failed. The Nazis succeeded; coming to power, a bit later instead. They were nicer people.

Soviet Republics
Some were in Germany not the USSR. They were intended to become part of a world empire. It didn't come to pass in that form. Historians keep quiet about some things.

 

Bavarian Revolution
QUOTE
On 7 November 1918, the first anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, Kurt Eisner of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) declared Bavaria a "free state" – a declaration which overthrew the monarchy of the Wittelsbach dynasty which had ruled for over 700 years. Eisner became Minister-President of Bavaria. Though he advocated a "socialist republic", he distanced himself from the Russian Bolsheviks, declaring that his government would protect property rights. For a few days, the Munich economist Lujo Brentano served as People's Commissar for Trade (Volkskommissar für Handel).

Soon after, on 3 May 1919, what remained loyal of the German army (called the "White Guards of Capitalism" by the Communists), with a force of 9,000, and Freikorps such as the Freikorps Epp and the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt, with 30,000, entered Munich and defeated the Communists after bitter street fights in which over 1,000 volunteer supporters of the government were killed. About 700 men and women were arrested and executed by the victorious Freikorps. Leviné was condemned to death for treason.
UNQUOTE
Kurt Eisner, a Jew was quite decent. The oiks that came after were not.

 

The March 1921 Action [ Marzaktion ]
QUOTE
The debacle represented by the ‘March Action’ in Germany in 1921 was a crucial turning point in the development of the Communist International. The defeat led to a crisis in the German Communist Party (KPD), which had repercussions for the entire International. Under the immediate impact of the defeat, the Third Congress of the Comintern steered a course away from the adventurism and putschism which Bukharin and Zinoviev’s ‘theory of the offensive’ had encouraged, and adopted the policy of the united front. Yet even after such a graphic lesson, the united front continued to be resisted in practice by a number of important Comintern sections.
UNQUOTE
The communists tried. The communists failed. These points matter. The Wiki does not write it up. That proves its importance. Adolf took over instead and held back the hordes from the East. This is not to say that he was a friend.

 

Munich Soviet Republic ex Wiki
QUOTE
The Bavarian Soviet Republic, also known as the Munich Soviet Republic (German: Bayerische Räterepublik or Münchner Räterepublik) was, as part of the German Revolution of 1918–1919, the short-lived attempt to establish a socialist state in the form of a democratic workers' council republic in the Free State of Bavaria. It sought independence from the also recently proclaimed Weimar Republic. Its capital was Munich.

Kurt Eisner's bloodless revolution
On the afternoon of 7 November 1918, the first anniversary of the Russian revolution, Kurt Eisner of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) addressed a crowd, estimated to have been about 60,000, on the Theresienwiese (current site of the Oktoberfest ). He demanded an immediate peace, an 8 hour workday, relief for the unemployed, abdication of the Bavarian king, King Ludwig III, and Emperor Wilhelm II, and proposed the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils..........

After Eisner's USPD had lost the elections, he decided to resign from his office. On 21 February 1919, as he was on his way to parliament to announce his resignation, he was shot dead by the right-wing nationalist Anton Graf von Arco auf Valley, who was rejected from membership in the Thule Society because of Jewish ancestry on his mother's side. This assassination caused unrest and lawlessness in Bavaria, and the news of a Soviet revolution in Hungary encouraged communists and anarchists to seize power........

Ernst Toller government
On 6 April 1919, a Soviet Republic was formally proclaimed. Initially, it was ruled by USPD members such as Ernst Toller, and anarchists like Gustav Landauer, Silvio Gesell and Erich Mühsam. Toller, a playwright, described the revolution as the "Bavarian Revolution of Love",[4] but he was not a very effective politician, and his government did little to restore order in Munich[citation needed].

His government members were also not always well-chosen. For instance, the Foreign Affairs Deputy Dr. Franz Lipp(fr) (who had been admitted several times to psychiatric hospitals), declared war on Switzerland over the Swiss refusal to lend 60 locomotives to the Soviet Republic.[5] He also claimed to be well acquainted with Pope Benedict XV[6] and he informed Vladimir Lenin via cable that the ousted former Minister-President Hoffmann had fled to Bamberg and taken the key to the ministry toilet with him.

Communist coup d'etat
On Sunday, April 12, 1919, the Communist Party seized power, with Eugen Leviné [ a Jew of course ] Editor ] as their leader.[8] Leviné began to enact communist reforms, which included forming a "Red Army", seizing cash and food supplies, expropriating luxurious apartments and giving them to the homeless and placing factories under the ownership and control of their workers. Leviné also had plans to abolish paper money and reform the education system, but never had time to implement them.

At the suggestion of Vladimir Lenin, Leviné took hostages from among the elite. When his troops refused to execute the hostages, Russian soldiers were sent to do it.[9] On 30 April 1919, eight men, including the well-connected Prince Gustav of Thurn and Taxis, were accused as right-wing spies and executed. The Thule Society's secretary, Countess Hella von Westarp, was also murdered.[10]

Demise
Soon after, on 3 May 1919, remaining loyal elements of the German army (called the "White Guards of Capitalism" by the communists), with a force of 9,000, and Freikorps (such as the Freikorps Epp and the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt) with a force of about 30,000 men, entered Munich and defeated the communists after bitter street fighting in which over 1,000 supporters of the government were killed. About 700 men and women were arrested and summarily executed by the victorious Freikorps troops. Leviné was condemned to death for treason, and was shot by a firing squad in Stadelheim Prison.
UNQUOTE
People explaining why Adolf are keen on ignoring the Jews taking over.

 

German Revolution ex Wiki
QUOTE
The German Revolution (German: Novemberrevolution) was the politically-driven civil conflict in Germany at the end of World War I. The period lasted from November 1918 until the formal establishment of the Weimar Republic in August 1919.

The roots of the revolution can be found in the German Empire's fortune in the First World War and the social tensions which came to a head shortly thereafter. The first acts of revolution were triggered by the policy of the Supreme Command and its missing coordination with the Naval Command which, in the face of defeat, insisted on continuing a lost battle with the British Royal Navy. The Wilhelmshaven mutiny (a sailors' revolt) then ensued in the naval ports of Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, and the spirit of rebellion spread across the country and led to the proclamation of a republic on 9 November 1918. Shortly thereafter Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated.

The revolutionaries, inspired by communist ideas, failed to take control as the Bolsheviks had in Russia, as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) leadership refused to work with those who supported the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, fearing an all-out civil war in Germany between the communists and the reactionary conservatives, the SPD did not plan to completely strip the old imperial elites of their power and instead sought to integrate them into the new social democratic system. In this endeavour, SPD leftists sought an alliance with the Supreme Command. The army and Freikorps (nationalist militias) quelled the so-called Spartacist uprising by force. The political fragmentation among the left-wing was a significant factor in the failure of the left to seize power.

The revolution ended officially on August 11, 1919, when the Weimar Constitution was adopted.

Background
German Empire and Social Democrats
The German Revolutions of 1848 failed to create democracy. In the following decades, the majority of Germans more or less came to terms with the authoritarian state, especially after a partial national unity (Kleindeutschland) had been achieved under Prussian leadership in 1871.

The newly created German Empire was a constitutional monarchy. The members of the Reichstag were elected democratically, but the parliament had very little influence on imperial politics. The Imperial Government was not responsible to the parliament but only to the Kaiser. Proposed laws needed the approval of the Bundesrat (Upper House) and the Kaiser, who in turn could dissolve the Reichstag at any time and call for new elections. The Reichstag's only important authority lay in the approval of the state budget except its biggest item: military expenditure.[1]

The Social Democrats, joining to create the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD), had been represented in the Reichstag since 1871. It was the only party in the German Empire to actively demand a republican government. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck declared the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1878 and prosecuted SPD members until he was dismissed by the Kaiser in 1890. Nevertheless, the SPD was able to increase its numbers of votes in nearly every election. In the elections of 1912 the Social Democrats received 28% of the votes and, with 110 deputies, made up the strongest faction in parliament.

In the 43 years between the founding of the German Empire and World War I, the SPD not only grew in importance but also changed its character. Starting in 1898, the so-called "Revisionists" called for the major objective of revolution to be removed from the party agenda while advocating that social reforms to the capitalist economic system should be pursued instead. The Marxist wing of the party was able to assert itself, but the continuing revolutionary rhetoric only barely covered the fact that, after having been legalized in 1890, the SPD had practically become a reformist party. After they had been labelled as "vaterlandslose Gesellen" ("unpatriotic bunch") for so long, the Social Democrats considered themselves to be German patriots. By the outbreak of World War I it became obvious that the SPD had become an integral – albeit opposing – part of the Empire.[2]

SPD and World War I
Around 1900, German Social Democracy was considered to be the leading force in the international Labour Movement. With 28% of the votes in 1912 the Social Democrats had developed into a faction to be reckoned with in Germany. Party membership was around 1 million and the party press (Vorwärts) alone had 1.5 million subscribers. Social Democratic unions, the majority of all unions, had 2.5 million members. In addition, there were numerous co-operative societies (for example, apartment co-ops, shop co-ops, etc.), cultural and other associations directly linked to the SPD, to the unions or adhered along Social Democratic lines. Other noteworthy parties in the Reichstag of 1912 were the Catholic Centre Party (91), the Conservatives (57), the National Liberals (45) and Progressive People's Party (42), the Poles (18) and the Alsatians (9).

At the European congresses of the second Socialist International, the SPD had always agreed to resolutions asking for combined action of Socialists in case of a war. Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the SPD — like other socialist parties in Europe — organized extensive anti-war demonstrations during the July Crisis. After Rosa Luxemburg, representing the left wing of the party, had called for disobedience and rejection of the war in the name of the entire party, the imperial government planned to arrest the party leaders immediately at the onset of war. Friedrich Ebert, one of the two party leaders since 1913, traveled to Zürich with Otto Braun in order to save the party's funds from being confiscated.

After Germany declared war on the Russian Empire on August 1, 1914, the majority of the SPD-newspapers initially shared the general enthusiasm for the war. In the first days of August, the editors believed themselves to be in line with the late August Bebel who had died the previous year. In 1904 he had declared in the Reichstag that the SPD would support an armed defence of Germany against a foreign attack. In 1907 at a party convention in Essen he assured that he himself would "shoulder the gun" if it was to fight against (Czarist) Russia, the "enemy of all culture and all the suppressed".[3][4] In the face of the general enthusiasm for the war among the population, which believed in an attack by the Entente powers, many SPD deputies worried they might lose many of their voters with their consistent pacifism. In addition, the government of imperial chancellor Bethmann Hollweg threatened to outlaw all parties in case of war. On the other hand, the chancellor cleverly exploited the anti-czarist stance of the SPD to procure the party's approval for the war.

The party leadership and the party's deputies were split on the issue of support for the war: 96 deputies including Friedrich Ebert approved the war bonds demanded by the imperial government. 14 deputies headed by the second party leader, Hugo Haase, spoke out against the bonds but nevertheless followed party voting instructions and raised their hands in favour.

Thus, the whole SPD-faction in the Reichstag voted in favour of the war bonds on August 4. Two days earlier the Free Unions had already agreed to refrain from labour strikes and demands for higher wages for the duration of the war. It was with these decisions by the Party and the Unions that the full mobilization of the German army became possible. Haase explained this decision against his will with the words: "We will not let the fatherland alone in the hour of need!". The Kaiser welcomed the so-called "truce" (Burgfrieden), declaring: "Ich kenne keine Parteien mehr, ich kenne nur noch Deutsche!" ("I know no more parties, I know only Germans!").[5]

Even Karl Liebknecht, later becoming the symbol of the most decisive opponents of the war, initially followed the party line: he abstained from voting to not defy his own faction. But a few days later he joined the Gruppe Internationale (Group International) which Rosa Luxemburg had founded on August 5, 1914 with Franz Mehring, Wilhelm Pieck and four others from the left wing of the party, adhering to the pre-war resolutions of the SPD. From this group emerged the nation wide Spartacus League (Spartakusbund) on January 1, 1916. As of December 2, 1914 and initially the only deputy of the Reichstag, Liebknecht voted against further war bonds. Although he was not permitted to present his speech connected with this vote, it was made public through the circulation of an illegal leaflet:

The present war was not willed by any of the nations participating in it and it is not waged in the interest of the Germans or any other people. It is an imperialist war, a war for capitalist control of the world market, for the political domination of huge territories and to give scope to industrial and banking capital.

Because of high demand this leaflet was soon printed and evolved into the so called "Political Letters" (Politischen Briefe), the collections of which afterward were illegally published under the name "Spartacus Letters" (Spartakusbriefe). As of December 1916 these were replaced by the journal "Spartakus", which appeared irregularly until November 1918.

This open opposition against the party line put Liebknecht at odds even with those party members around Haase who actually were against the war bonds themselves. At the instigation of the SPD party leadership, Liebknecht was drafted in February 1915 for military service in order to dispose of him — the only SPD deputy to get drafted. Because of his attempts to organize objectors of the war, he was expelled from the SPD, and in June 1916, he was sentenced on grounds of high treason to four years in prison. While he was in the army, Rosa Luxemburg wrote most of the Spartacus Letters. After having served a prison sentence, she was put back in jail under "preventive detention" until the war ended.

Split of the SPD
The longer the war lasted and the more victims it took, the less SPD members were prepared to keep up the "truce" of 1914; also, since 1916, the guidelines of German policy was set not by the Kaiser and the Imperial Government but the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL) under the Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. Power in Germany had passed to the military and it was Ludendorff who made the fundamental and essential decisions. He was later to give German history a decisive turn. The generals pursued expansionist and offensive war goals and subjected civil life to the needs of commanding a war and a war economy. For the labor force, this meant (among other things) 12-hour work days at minimal wages with inadequate provisions.

After the outbreak of the Russian February Revolution in 1917, the first organized strikes erupted in German armament factories in March and April that year with about 300,000 participating workers. The USA's entry into the war on 6 April 1917 threatened to further worsen the situation. The Kaiser tried to appease the strikers in his Easter address of 7 April. He promised democratic elections after the war in Prussia where the three-class franchise system was still in force.

After the SPD-leadership under Friedrich Ebert had excluded the opponents of the war from the party ranks, the Spartacists and then the so-called "Revisionists", like Eduard Bernstein, and the Centrists, like Karl Kautsky responded to the growing dissatisfaction among the labor force. On 9 April 1917, they founded Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) under the leadership of Hugo Haase.

The SPD, also called "MSPD" (Majority Social Democrats), remained under Friedrich Ebert. The USPD demanded the immediate end of the war and a further democratization of Germany, but did not have a unified agenda for social policies. The Spartacus League, which until then had opposed a split of the party, now made up the left wing of the USPD. Both the USPD and the Spartacists continued their anti-war propaganda in factories, especially in the armament plants.

Impact of the Russian Revolution
 

Further information: Russian Revolution (1917)
After the February Revolution in Russia and the toppling of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, on 15 March 1917, the Russian Provisional Government, since the previous summer led by Alexander Kerensky, continued the war on the side of the Entente powers. Nevertheless, the German Imperial Government now saw one more chance for victory. To support the anti war sentiment in Russia, it let the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin, pass in a sealed train wagon from his exile in Switzerland through Germany, Sweden and Finland to St. Petersburg.

As hoped, the Bolsheviks, who had demanded an immediate end to the war, were able to seize power in the October Revolution. Lenin's success raised fears among German bourgeoisie that such a revolution could take place in Germany. With unease the SPD leadership also took note that a determined and well managed group such as the Bolsheviks was able to assert itself against a parliamentary majority of moderate socialists and middle-class-parties. Their endeavor to prevent a similar development in Germany determined their behavior during the German Revolution.

Otto Braun, board member of the SPD and, later, prime minister of Prussia, clarified the position of his party in a leading article in the SPD newspaper Vorwärts under the title "The Bolsheviks and Us":

Socialism cannot be erected on bayonets and machine guns. If it is to last, it must be realized with democratic means. Therefore of course it is a necessary prerequisite that the economic and social conditions for socializing society are ripe. If this was the case in Russia, the Bolsheviks no doubt could rely on the majority of the people. As this is not the case, they established a reign of the sword that could not have been more brutal and reckless under the disgraceful regime of the Tzar. [...] Therefore we must draw a thick, visible dividing line between us and the Bolsheviks.[6]

In the same month in which Otto Braun's article appeared another series of strikes swept through the country (January Strikes) with the participation of over 1 million workers. For the first time during these strikes the so called "Revolutionary Stewards" (Revolutionäre Obleute) took action. They were to play an important part in further developments. They called themselves "Councils" (Räte) after the Russian "Soviets". In order to weaken their influence Ebert joined the Berlin strike leadership and attained an early termination of the strike.

On 3 March 1918 the new Soviet government agreed to the peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk negotiated with the Germans by Leon Trotsky. This settlement contained much harsher terms for the Russians than the later Treaty of Versailles demanded of the Germans. The Supreme Command was now able to move a part of the eastern armies to the western front. Most Germans believed that also in the west victory was at hand.

Leftist and rightist approaches to peace
After the US had entered the war, the situation on the western front became more precarious for the Germans. For that reason, and also to take the wind out of the USPD's sails, the SPD in the Reichstag joined the "Interfractional Committee" with the Catholic Centre Party and the Progressive People's Party. In Summer 1917, these three parties passed a peace resolution providing for a peace through rapprochement without annexations and payments (as opposed to a peace through victory and annexations, as the political right was demanding). Along with everyone else in the country, the committee still believed in a victory. The Supreme Command did not like this resolution, and in the negotiations from December 1917 to March 1918 imposed a peace by victory upon Russia.

The Supreme Command also outright rejected the "Fourteen Points" set out by President Woodrow Wilson on January 8 of 1918. Wilson wanted peace on the basis of "self-determination of peoples" without victors or conquered. Hindenburg and Ludendorff rejected the offer, because, after victory over Russia, they again believed themselves to be in a stronger position. They continued to bet on a "peace through victory" with far-reaching annexations at the expense of Germany's opponents in the war.

Request for cease fire and change of Constitution
After the victory in the east the Supreme Command ordered a new offensive in the west in order to bring about a decisive turn in favour of the Germans. But when by July 1918 the last reserves were burnt up, military defeat of Germany was sealed. On 8 August 1918, Canadian, Australian and French divisions using British Mark I tanks broke through the German lines between Albert and Moreuil. In mid-September the Balkan Front collapsed. Bulgaria, an ally of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, capitulated on 27 September. The collapse of Austria-Hungary was now only a matter of days.

On 29 September the Supreme Command informed the Kaiser, who was the Supreme War Lord, and the Imperial Chancellor Count Georg von Hertling at army headquarters in Spa, Belgium that the military situation was hopeless. Ludendorff, probably fearing a break-through, claimed that he couldn't guarantee the front to hold for another 24 hours and demanded a request be given to the Entente for an immediate cease fire. In addition, he recommended the acceptance of the main demand of US President Wilson and put the Imperial Government on a democratic footing, hoping for more favourable peace terms. This enabled him to save the face of the Imperial Army and put the responsibility for the capitulation and its consequences squarely into the hands of the democratic parties and the parliament. As he said to officers of his staff on 1 October: They now must lie on the bed that they've made us."[7]

Thus the so called "Stab-in-the-back legend" (Dolchstoßlegende) was born, according to which the revolutionaries had attacked the undefeated army from the rear, and turned the almost certain victory into a defeat. Ludendorff, who intended to cover up his own failure, contributed considerably to this grave distortion and falsification of history. It was of great importance that the Imperial Government and the German Army managed to shirk their responsibilities at the very beginning and put the blame for the defeat on the new democratic government. The motivation behind this is verified by the following citation in the autobiography of Groener, Ludendorff's successor:

It was just fine with me when Army and Army Command remained as guiltless as possible in these wretched truce negotiations, from which nothing good could be expected.[8]

In nationalist circles the myth fell on fertile ground. The Nationalists soon defamed the revolutionaries and even politicians like Ebert, who never wanted a revolution and did everything to prevent it, as "November Criminals" (Novemberverbrecher). The radical right did not even stop at political assassinations, e.g. Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau. In Hitler's attempt at a coup in 1923 together with Ludendorff they deliberately chose the heavily symbolic 9 November. In his later ascent to power, Hitler, who had served in the German army as a corporal, cunningly exploited the sentiments of the homecomers who felt betrayed not only by the new democratic government but also by their commanders who had sent them to useless slaughter, especially in the Battle of Verdun.

Although shocked by Ludendorff's report and the news of the defeat, the majority parties in the Reichstag, and especially the SPD, were willing to take on the responsibility of government at the last minute. As the convinced royalist Hertling objected to handing over the reins to the Reichstag, on 3 October, Kaiser Wilhelm II appointed His Grand-Ducal Highness Prince Maximilian of Baden the new Imperial Chancellor. Baden was considered a liberal yet a representative of the royal family. In his cabinet, Social Democrats took on responsibility. The most prominent and highest-ranking was Philipp Scheidemann as undersecretary without portfolio. The following day the new government offered to the allies the truce which Ludendorff had demanded.

It was only on 5 October that the German public was informed of the dismal situation. In the general state of shock about the defeat, which now had become obvious, the constitutional changes, formally decided by the Reichstag on 28 October, went almost unnoticed. From then on the Chancellor and the Ministers depended on the confidence of the Reichstag majority. After the supreme command of the Armed Forces had passed from the Kaiser to the Imperial Government, the German Empire changed from a constitutional to a parliamentary monarchy. As far as the SPD was concerned, the so-called October Constitution met all the important constitutional objectives of the party. Ebert already regarded 5 October as the birthday of German democracy, after the Kaiser voluntarily ceded power and thus considered a revolution as unnecessary.

Third Wilson note and Ludendorff's dismissal
In the following three weeks American President Woodrow Wilson responded to the request for a truce with three diplomatic notes. As a precondition for negotiations he demanded the retreat of Germany from all occupied territories, the cessation of submarine activities and – in between lines – the Kaiser's abdication. The letter was to render the process of democratization irreversible.

After the third Wilson Note of 24 October, Ludendorff, in a sudden change of mind, declared the conditions of the allies as unacceptable. He now demanded to resume the war which he himself had declared lost only one month earlier. During the procedure of his request for a truce, the allies realized the military weakness of the Empire. The German troops had adapted themselves to the ending of the war and were pressing to get home. They were hardly willing to fight more battles, and desertions were on the increase.

So the Imperial Government stayed on course and replaced Ludendorff as First General Quartermaster with General Wilhelm Groener. Ludendorff fled with false papers to neutral Sweden. On 5 November the allies agreed to take up negotiations for a truce. But after the third Wilson Note, many soldiers and the general population believed that the Kaiser must abdicate in order to achieve peace.

Revolution
Sailors' revolt

Main article: Wilhelmshaven mutiny
While the war-weary troops and the population disappointed by the Kaiser's government awaited the speedy end of the war, the Imperial Naval Command in Kiel under Admiral Franz von Hipper and Admiral Reinhardt Scheer, without authorization, planned to dispatch the fleet for a last battle against the Royal Navy in the English Channel.

The naval order of 28 October 1918[9] and the preparations to sail first triggered a mutiny among the affected sailors and then a general revolution which was to sweep aside the monarchy within a few days. The mutinous sailors had no intention of risking their lives near the end of the war, thinking it futile. They were also convinced that the credibility of the new democratic government which was seeking peace would have been compromised by a simultaneous naval attack.

The sailors revolt started on the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven, where the German fleet had anchored in expectation of a planned battle. During the night from 29 to 30 October 1918 some crews refused to obey orders. Sailors on board of three ships from the Third Navy Squadron refused to raise anchor. Part of the crew on SMS Thüringen and SMS Helgoland, two battle ships from the First Navy Squadron, committed outright mutiny and sabotage. However, when a day later some torpedo boats pointed their cannons onto these ships, the mutineers gave up and were led away without any resistance. But the Naval Command had to drop its plans as it was felt that the crew's loyalty could not be relied upon any more. The Third Navy Squadron was ordered back to Kiel.

The squadron commander Vice-Admiral Kraft carried out a manoeuvre with his battle ships in Helgoland Bay. When this "worked perfectly" (tadellos funktionierte) he believed himself to have regained control of his crews. While moving through the Kiel Canal he had 47 sailors from the SMS Markgraf, who were seen as the ringleaders, imprisoned. In Holtenau (the end of the canal in Kiel) they were brought to the Arrestanstalt (military prison) in Kiel and to Fort Herwarth in the north of Kiel.

The sailors and stokers were now pulling out all the stops to prevent the fleet from setting sail again and to achieve the release of their comrades. Some 250 met in the evening of 1 November in the Union House in Kiel. Delegations sent to their officers, requesting the mutineers' release, were not heard. The sailors were now looking for closer ties to the unions, the USPD and the SPD. Thereupon the Union House was closed by police, leading to an even larger joint open air meeting on 2 November. Led by the sailor Karl Artelt, who worked in the torpedo workshop in Kiel-Friedrichsort and by the mobilized shipyard worker Lothar Popp, both USPD members, the sailors called for a large meeting the following day on the same place (Großer Exerzierplatz, large drill ground).

This call was heeded by several thousand people on the afternoon of 3 November with workers' representatives also present. The slogan "Peace and Bread" (Frieden und Brot) was raised showing that the sailors and workers demanded not only the release of the imprisoned but also the end of the war and the improvement of food provisions. Eventually, the people supported Artelt's call to free the prisoners, and they moved in the direction of the military prison. Shortly before, Sub-Lieutenant Steinhäuser, in order to stop the demonstrators, ordered his patrol to give warning shots and then to shoot directly into the demonstration. Seven people were killed and 29 severely injured. Some demonstrators also opened fire. Steinhäuser was severely injured by rifle-butt blows and shots, but contrary to later statements, he was not killed.[10] After this eruption the demonstrators as well as the patrol dispersed. Nevertheless the mass protest turned into a general revolt.

On the morning of 4 November groups of mutineers moved through the town. Sailors in a large barracks compound in a northern district of Kiel refused obedience: after a division inspection by the commander spontaneous demonstrations took place. Karl Artelt organized the first soldiers' council, and soon many more were set up. The governor of the navy station, Wilhelm Souchon, had to negotiate.

The imprisoned sailors and stokers were freed. Soldiers and workers brought public and military institutions under their control. When, against Souchon's promise, different troops advanced to end the rebellion, they were intercepted by the mutineers and either sent back or decided to joined the sailors and workers. By the evening of 4 November, Kiel was firmly in the hands of approximately 40,000 rebellious sailors, soldiers and workers, as was Wilhelmshaven two days later.

On the same evening the SPD deputy Gustav Noske arrived in Kiel and was welcomed enthusiastically, although he had orders from the new government and the SPD leadership to bring the uprising under control. He had himself elected chairman of the soldiers' council and reinstated peace and order. Some days later he took over the governor's post, while Lothar Popp from the USPD became chairman of the overall soldiers' council. During the coming weeks Noske actually managed to reduce the influence of the councils in Kiel, but he could not prevent the spread of the revolution to all of Germany. The events had already spread far beyond the city limits.

Spread of revolution to the whole Empire
As of 4 November delegations of the sailors scattered out to all larger cities in the country. Already by 7 November the revolution had seized all larger coastal cities as well as Hanover, Brunswick, Frankfurt and Munich. In Munich a Workers' and Soldiers' Council forced the last King of Bavaria, Ludwig III, to abdicate. Bavaria was the first state of the Empire to be declared a "Council Republic" (Räterepublik) Bavarian Soviet Republic by USPD-Member Kurt Eisner. In the following days the royals of all the other German states abdicated, the last one on 23 November was Prince Günther Victor of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt. The Workers' and Soldiers' Councils were almost entirely made up of SPD and USPD members. Their program was democracy, pacifism and anti-militarism. Apart from the royals they deprived only the hitherto almighty military commands of power. The imperial civilian administration and office bearers-–police, municipal administrations, courts—remained unscathed. There were also hardly any confiscations of property or occupations of factories because such measures were expected from the new government. In order to create an executive committed to the revolution and to the future government, the councils for the moment claimed only to take over the supervision of the administration from the military commands. Thus, the SPD was able to establish a firm base on the local level. But while the councils believed to be acting in the interest of the new order, the party leaders of the SPD regarded the councils as disturbing elements for a peaceful changeover of power, which they imagined already to have taken place. Along with the middle-class parties they demanded speedy elections for a national assembly which was to make the final decision on the type of state. This soon brought the SPD into opposition with a large part of revolutionaries. It was especially the USPD that took over their demands, one of which was elections as late as possible hoping to create unchangeable facts that met the expectations of a large part of the workforce.

Reactions in Berlin
Ebert agreed with Max von Baden that a social revolution was to be prevented and that state order must be upheld at any cost. For the restructuring of the state, Ebert wanted to win over the middle-class parties, which already had cooperated with the SPD in the Reichstag in 1917, as well as the old elites of the Empire. He wanted to avoid a feared radicalization of the revolution along Russian lines and he also worried that the precarious situation of supplies could collapse when the existing administration would be taken over by inexperienced revolutionaries. He was certain that the SPD would be able to implement its reform plans due to its parliamentary majorities in the future.

Ebert did his best to act in agreement with the old powers, and had in mind to save the monarchy. In order to produce some success to his followers he demanded as of November 6 the abdication of the Kaiser. But Wilhelm II, still in his headquarters in Spa, was playing for time. After the Entente had agreed to truce negotiations on that day he hoped to return to Germany at the head of the army and to quell the revolution by force.

According to notes taken by Max von Baden Ebert declared on 7 November: "If the Kaiser doesn't abdicate the social revolution is unavoidable. But I don't want it, indeed I hate it like the sin." (Wenn der Kaiser nicht abdankt, dann ist die soziale Revolution unvermeidlich. Ich aber will sie nicht, ja, ich hasse sie wie die Sünde.)[11] Max von Baden planned to travel to Spa and personally convince the Kaiser of the necessity to abdicate. Yet, this plan was overtaken by the quickly deteriorating situation in Berlin.

9 November 1918: Two proclamations of a republic
In order to remain master of the situation, in the afternoon of 9 November, Friedrich Ebert demanded the chancellorship for himself.

The news of the Kaiser's abdication came too late to make any impression upon the demonstrators. Nobody followed the public appeals. More and more demonstrators demanded the total abolition of the monarchy. Karl Liebknecht, just released from prison, had returned to Berlin and re-founded the Spartacist League the previous day. At lunch in the Reichstag the SPD deputy chairman Philipp Scheidemann learned that Liebknecht planned the proclamation of a Socialist Republic. Scheidemann did not want to leave the initiative to the Spartacists and without further ado stepped out onto a balcony of the Reichstag. From there he proclaimed on his own authority -– and against Ebert's expressed will -– a republic before a mass of demonstrating people. A few hours later Berlin newspapers published that in the Berlin Tiergarten -– presumably at the same time -— Liebknecht had proclaimed a Socialist Republic, which he affirmed once more before a crowd of people assembled around 4 p.m. at the Berlin Royal Residence.

At that time Karl Liebknecht's intentions were little known to the public. The Spartacist League's demands of 7 October for a far reaching restructuring of the economy, the army and the judiciary – amongst other things by abolishing the death penalty—had not yet been publicized. The biggest bone of contention with the SPD was to be the Spartacist's demand for the establishment of "unalterable political facts" on the ground by social and other measures "before" the election of a constituent assembly, while the SPD wanted to leave the decision for the future economic system to the assembly.

Ebert was faced with a dilemma. The first proclamation he had issued on 9 November was addressed 'To the citizens of Germany'.

Ebert wanted to take the sting out of the revolutionary mood and meet the demands of the demonstrators for the unity of the labour parties. He offered the USPD participation in the government and was ready to accept Liebknecht as a minister. Liebknecht in turn demanded the control of the workers' councils over the army. As USPD chairman Hugo Haase was in Kiel and the deliberations went on the USPD deputies were not able to reach a decision on that day.

Neither the early announcement of the Kaiser's abdication by Max von Baden and Ebert's chancellorship, nor Scheidemann's proclamation of the Republic were covered by the constitution. These were all revolutionary actions by protagonists who did not want a revolution but nevertheless created lasting facts. However, a real revolutionary action took place the same evening which, in the end, proved to have been in vain.

Around 8 p.m. a group of 100 Revolutionary Stewards (Revolutionäre Obleute) from the larger Berlin factories occupied the Reichstag. Led by their speakers Richard Müller and Emil Barth they formed a Revolutionary Parliament. Most of the participating stewards had already been leaders during the January strikes. They did not trust the SPD leadership and had planned a coup independently from the sailor's revolt for 11 November but were surprised by the revolutionary events since Kiel. In order to snatch the initiative from Ebert they now decided to announce elections for the following day: On that Sunday every Berlin factory and every regiment was to decide on workers' and soldiers' councils which then were to elect a revolutionary government from members of the 2 labour parties (SPD and USPD). This Council of the People's Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) was to execute the resolutions of the Revolutionary Parliament as the revolutionaries intended and to replace Ebert's function as chancellor.

10 November: SPD leadership in opposition to revolutionary shop stewards. Armistice

The same evening the SPD leadership heard of these plans. As the elections and the following councils' meeting could not be prevented Ebert sent speakers to all Berlin regiments and into the factories in the same night and the early following morning. They were to influence the elections in his favour and announce the intended participation of the USPD in the government.

In turn, these activities did not escape the attention of Richard Müller and the revolutionary shop stewards. Seeing that Ebert would also play the tune in the new government, they planned to propose to the assembly not only the election of a government but also the appointment of an Action Committee. This committee was to co-ordinate the activities of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. For this election the Stewards had already prepared a list of names on which the SPD was not represented. In this manner they hoped to install a monitoring body acceptable to them watching the government.

In the assembly that convened on 10 November in the Circus Busch the majority stood on the side of the SPD: almost all Soldiers' Councils and a large part of the workers representatives. They repeated the demand for the "Unity of the Working Class" which had been put forward by the revolutionaries the previous day and now used this motto in order to push through Ebert's line. As planned, three members of each socialist party were elected into the "Council of People's Representatives", from the USPD, their chairman Hugo Haase, the deputy Wilhelm Dittmann and Emil Barth for the Revolutionary Stewards; from the SPD Ebert, Scheidemann and the Magdeburg deputy Otto Landsberg.

The proposal by the shop stewards to additionally elect an Action Committee took the SPD leadership by surprise and started heated debates. Ebert finally succeeded in also having this 24-member "Executive Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils" equally filled with SPD and USPD members. The Executive Council was chaired by Richard Müller (USPD) and Brutus Molkenbuhr. In theory, the Executive Council was the highest-ranking council of the revolutionary regime and therefore Müller the head of state of the new declared "Socialist Republic of Germany". But in practice the council's initiative was blocked by internal power-struggles. The Executive Council decided to summon an "Imperial Council Convention" in December to Berlin.

Although Ebert had saved the decisive part of the SPD he was not happy with the results. He regarded the Council Parliament and the Executive Council not as helpful but only as an obstacle on the way to a new system of government with a smooth transition from the Empire. The whole SPD leadership mistrusted the councils rather than the old elites in army and administration. They considerably overestimated the old elite's loyalty to the new republic. What bothered Ebert most was that now in front of the Councils he could not act as Chancellor but only as chairman of a revolutionary government. Indeed, conservatives regarded him as a traitor although he had taken the lead of the revolution only in order to stop it.

In the 8 weeks of double rule of Councils and Imperial Government the latter always was dominant. The whole higher level administration reported only to Ebert, although Haase formally was a chairman in the Council with equal rights. Concerning the question of real power, there was a phone call on the evening of 10 November between Ebert and General Wilhelm Groener, the new First General Quartermaster in Spa, Belgium. Assuring Ebert of the support of the Army, the General was given Ebert's promise to reinstate the military hierarchy and, with the help of the army, to take action against the Councils.

Behind the secret Ebert-Groener pact stood the SPD's worry that the revolution could end in a Council (Soviet) Republic following the Russian example. However, this pact was not able to win over the Imperial Officer Corps for the republic. As Ebert's behaviour became increasingly puzzling to the revolutionary workers, the soldiers and their stewards, the SPD leadership lost more and more confidence of its supporters without gaining any sympathies from the opponents of the revolution on the right.

In the turmoil of this day, the Ebert government's acceptance of the harsh terms of the Entente for a truce, after a renewed demand by the Supreme Command, went almost unnoticed. On 11 November, the Centre Party deputy Matthias Erzberger, on behalf of Berlin, signed the armistice agreement in Compiègne, France. Thus, World War 1 had come to an end.

Stinnes-Legien-Agreement
The revolutionaries disagreed among themselves about the future economic and state system. Both SPD and USPD favoured placing at least the heavy industry under democratic control. The left wings of both parties and the Revolutionary Stewards wanted to go beyond that and establish a "direct democracy" in the production sector, with elected delegates controlling the political power. It was not only in the interest of the SPD to prevent a Council Democracy, even the unions would have been rendered superfluous by the councils.

To prevent this development, the union leaders under Carl Legien and the representatives of big industry under Hugo Stinnes and Carl Friedrich von Siemens met in Berlin from 9 to 12 November. On 15 November they signed an agreement with advantages for both sides: the union representatives promised to guarantee orderly production, to end wild strikes, to drive back the influence of the councils and to prevent a nationalisation of means of production. For their part, the employers guaranteed to introduce the eight hour day, which the workers had demanded in vain for years. The employers agreed to the union claim of sole representation and to the lasting recognition of the unions instead of the Councils. Both parties formed a "Central Committee for the Maintenance of the Economy" (Zentralausschuss für die Aufrechterhaltung der Wirtschaft).

An "Arbitration Committee" (Schlichtungsausschuss) was to mediate in future conflicts between employers and unions. From now on, in every factory with more than 50 employees committees together with the management were to monitor the keeping to the wage settlements.

With this, the unions had achieved one of their long time demands but undermined all efforts for nationalising means of production and largely eliminated the Councils.

Interim government and council movement
The Reichstag had not been summoned since 9 November. The Council of the People's Deputies and the Executive Council had replaced the old government. But the previous administrative machinery remained unchanged. Imperial servants had only representatives of SPD and USPD assigned to them. These servants all kept their positions and continued to do their work in most parts unchanged.

On 12 November the Council of People's Representatives published its democratic and social government programme. It lifted the state of siege and censorship, abolished the "Gesindeordnung" (Servant Rules: rules governing relations between servant and master) and introduced universal suffrage from 20 years up, for the first time for women. There was an amnesty for all political prisoners. Regulations for the freedom of association, assembly and press were enacted. The eight hour day became statutory on the basis of the Stinnes-Legien-Agreement and benefits for unemployment, social insurance and workers' compensation were expanded.

At the insistence of USPD representatives the Council of People's Representatives appointed a "Nationalisation Committee", among others with Karl Kautsky, Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Hue. This committee was to examine which industries were "fit" for nationalisation and to prepare the nationalisation of the coal and steel industry. It sat until 7 April 1919, without any tangible result. "Self-Administration Bodies" were installed only in coal and potash mining and in the steel industry. From these bodies emerged the modern German Works or Factory Committees. Socialist expropriations were not initiated.

The SPD leadership worked with the old administration rather than with the new Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, because it considered them incapable of properly supplying the needs of the population. As of mid-November this caused continuing strife with the Executive Council. As the Council continuously changed its position following whoever it just happened to represent, Ebert withdrew more and more responsibilities planning to end the "meddling and interfering" of the Councils in Germany for good. But Ebert and the SPD leadership by far overestimated the power not only of the Council Movement but also of the Spartacist League. The Spartacist League, for example, never had control over the Council Movement as the conservatives and parts of the SPD believed.

In Leipzig, Hamburg, Bremen, Chemnitz and Gotha the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils put the city administrations under their control. In addition, in Brunswick, Düsseldorf, Mülheim/Ruhr and Zwickau all civil servants true to the Kaiser were arrested. In Hamburg and Bremen "Red Guards" were formed that were to protect the revolution. The Councils deposed the management of the Leuna Works, a giant chemical factory near Merseburg. The new Councils were often appointed spontaneously and arbitrarily and had no management experience whatsoever. But a majority of Councils came to arrangements with the old administrations and saw to it that law and order were quickly restored. For example, Max Weber was part of the workers' council of Heidelberg, and was pleasantly surprised that most members were moderate German liberals. The Councils took over the distribution of food, the police and the accommodation and provisions of the front-line soldiers that were gradually returning home.

Administration and Councils depended on each other: the former had the knowledge and experience, the latter had political clout. In most cases SPD-members had been elected into the Councils who regarded their job as interim solution. For them as well as for the majority of the population in 1918/19 the introduction of a Council Republic was never an issue, but they were not even given a chance to think about it. Many wanted to support the new government and expected it to abolish militarism and the authoritarian state. Being weary of the war and hoping for a peaceful solution, they partially overestimated the revolutionary achievements.

Imperial Council Convention
As decided by the Executive Committee the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in the whole Empire sent deputies to Berlin who were to convene on 16 December in the Circus Busch for the "First General Convention of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils" (Erster Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte). On 15 December Ebert and General Groener had troops ordered to Berlin to prevent this convention and to regain control of the capital. On 16 December one of the regiments intended for this plan advanced too early. In the attempt to arrest the Executive Council the soldiers opened fire on a demonstration of unarmed "Red Guards" which were Soldiers' Councils affiliated with the Spartacists, and killed 16 people.

With this the potential for violence and the danger of a coup from the right already became visible. Because of this experience, in the daily newspaper of the Spartacist League "Red Flag" (Rote Fahne) of 12 December, Rosa Luxemburg demanded the peaceful disarmament of the homecoming military units by the Berlin workforce. She wanted the Soldiers' Councils to be subordinated to the Revolutionary Parliament and the soldiers to become "re-educated".

On 10 December Ebert welcomed ten divisions returning from the front hoping to use them against the Councils. As it turned out, these troops also were not willing to go on fighting. The war was over, Christmas was at the door and most of the soldiers just wanted to go home to their families. So shortly after their arrival in Berlin they dispersed. The blow against the Convention of Councils did not take place.

This blow would have been unnecessary anyway because the convention that took up its work 16 December in the Prussian House of Representatives also consisted mainly of SPD followers. Not even Karl Liebknecht had managed to get a seat. The Spartacist League was not granted any influence. On 19 December the Councils voted 344 to 98 against the creation of a Council System as a basis for a new constitution. Instead, they supported the government's decision to call for elections for a constituent national assembly as soon as possible. This assembly was to decide upon the state system.

The Convention disagreed with Ebert only on the issue of control of the army. The Convention was demanding a say for the Central Council which it would elect, in the supreme command of the army, the free election of officers and the disciplinary powers for the Soldiers' Councils. That would have been contrary to the agreement between Ebert and General Groener. They both spared no effort to undo this decision. The Supreme Command which in the meantime had moved from Spa to Kassel, began to raise loyal volunteer corps (Freikorps) against the supposed Bolshevik menace. Unlike the revolutionary soldiers of November, these troops were monarchist-minded officers and men who feared the return into civil life.

Christmas crisis
After 9 November the government had ordered the newly created People's Navy Division (Volksmarinedivision) from Kiel to Berlin for its protection and stationed it in the Royal Stables (Marstall) of the Berlin Stadtschloss (Imperial City Residence). The Division was considered absolutely loyal and had indeed refused to participate in the coup attempt of 6 December. The sailors even deposed their commander because they saw him involved in the affair. It was this loyalty that now gave them the reputation of being in favour of the Spartacists. Ebert demanded their disbanding and withdrawal from the Residence and Otto Wels, as of 9 November commander of Berlin and in line with Ebert, refused the sailors' pay.

The dispute escalated on 23 December. After having been put off for days the sailors occupied the Imperial Chancellery, cut the phone lines, put the Council of People's Representatives under house arrest and captured Otto Wels. The sailors did not exploit the situation to eliminate the Ebert government, as could have been expected from Spartacist revolutionaries. Instead, they just insisted on their pay. Nevertheless, Ebert, who via secret phone line was in touch with the Supreme Command in Kassel, gave orders to attack the Residence with troops loyal to the government on the morning of 24 December. The sailors repelled the attack under their commander Heinrich Dorrenbach, losing about 30 men and civilians in the fight. The government troops had to withdraw from the centre of Berlin. They themselves were now disbanded and integrated into the newly formed Freikorps. To make up for the loss of face they temporarily occupied the editor's offices of the "Red Flag". But military power in Berlin once more was in the hands of the People's Navy Division. Again, the sailors did not take advantage of the situation.

On one side this shows that the sailors were not Spartacists, on the other that the revolution had no guidance. Even if Liebknecht had been the revolutionary leader like Lenin, to which legend later made him, the sailors as well as the Councils would not have accepted him as such. So the only result of the Christmas Crisis, which the Spartacists named "Ebert's Bloody Christmas", was that the Revolutionary Stewards called for a demonstration on Christmas Day and that the USPD left the government in protest on 29 December. They could not have done Ebert a bigger favour since he had let them participate only under the pressure of the revolutionary events. Within a few days the military defeat of the Ebert government had turned into a political victory.

Founding of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the January Revolt
The Spartacists concluded after their experiences with the SPD and the USPD that their goals could be met only in a party of their own. Also because of the unhappiness of many workers with the course of the revolution and joined by other left-socialist groups of the whole Empire they founded the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).[12]

Rosa Luxemburg drew up her founding programme and presented it on 31 December 1918. In this programme she pointed out that the communists could never take power without a clear will of the people in the majority. On 1 January she again demanded that the KPD participate in the planned elections but was outvoted. The majority still hoped to gain power by continued agitation in the factories and by the "pressure from the streets". After deliberations with the Spartacists the Revolutionary Stewards decided to remain in the USPD. This was a first defeat.

The decisive defeat of the left was to be brought in the first days of the new year in 1919. As in November before, almost spontaneously, a second revolutionary wave developed which, this time, was violently suppressed. The wave was started when on 4 January the government dismissed the chief constable of Berlin, Emil Eichhorn, who was a member of the USPD and who had refused to act against the demonstrating workers in the Christmas Crisis resulting in the USPD, Revolutionary Stewards and the KPD chairmen Karl Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck Eichhorn's calling for a demonstration to take place on the following day. To the surprise of the initiators the demonstration turned into an assembly of huge masses. On Sunday 5 January, as on 9 November 1918, hundreds of thousands of people poured into the centre of Berlin, many of them armed. In the afternoon the train stations and the newspaper district with the offices of the middle-class press and the "Vorwärts" were occupied. Some of the middle-class papers in the previous days had called not only for the raising of more Freikorps but also for the murder of the Spartacists.

The demonstrators were mainly the same as two months previous. They now demanded the fulfillment of the hopes expressed in November. The Spartacists by no means had a leading position. The demands came straight from the workforce supported by various groups left of the SPD. The following so-called "Spartacist Uprising" originated only partially in the KPD. KPD members were even a minority among the insurgents.

The initiators assembled at the Police Headquarters elected a 53-member "Interim Revolutionary Committee" (Provisorischer Revolutionsausschuss) which failed to make use of its power and was unable to give any clear direction. Liebknecht demanded the topple of the government and agreed with the majority of the committee that propagated the armed struggle. Rosa Luxemburg as well as the majority of KPD leaders thought a revolt at this moment to be a catastrophe and explicitly spoke out against it.

On the following day, 6 January, the Revolutionary Committee again called for a mass demonstration. This time even more people heeded the call. Again they carried placards and banners that said: "Brothers, don't shoot!" and remained waiting on an assembly square. A part of the Revolutionary Stewards armed themselves and called for the overthrow of the Ebert government. But the KPD-activists mostly failed in their endeavour to win over the troops. It turned out that even the units like the People's Navy Division were not willing to support the armed revolt, declaring itself neutral. The other regiments stationed in Berlin mostly remained loyal to the government.

While on Ebert's orders more troops were moving into Berlin, he accepted an offer by the USPD to mediate between him and the Revolutionary Committee. After the advance of the troops into the city became known and an SPD-leaflet appeared saying: "The hour of reckoning is nigh" the Committee broke off further negotiations on 8 January. That was opportunity enough for Ebert to use the troops stationed in Berlin against the occupiers. Beginning 9 January they violently quelled an improvised revolt. In addition to that, on 12 January, the anti-republican Freikorps, which had been raised more or less as death squads since the beginning of December, moved into Berlin. Gustav Noske, who had been People's Representative for Army and Navy for a few days, accepted the premium command of these troops saying: "If you like, someone has to be the bloodhound. I won't shy away from the responsibility."[13]

The Freikorps brutally cleared several buildings and executed the occupiers on the spot. Others soon surrendered, but some of them were still shot. The January revolt claimed 156 lives in Berlin.

Murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg
The alleged ringleaders of the January Revolt had to go into hiding and in spite of being urged by their allies refused to leave Berlin. On the evening of 15 January 1919 Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were discovered in a Berlin-Wilmersdorf apartment, arrested and handed over to the largest Freikorps, the heavily armed Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Division. Their commander, Captain Waldemar Pabst, had them questioned. That same night both prisoners were beaten unconscious with rifle butts and shot in the head. Rosa Luxemburg's body was thrown into the Landwehr Canal running through Berlin, where it was found only on 1 July. Karl Liebknecht's body, without a name, was delivered to a morgue.

The perpetrators for the most part went unpunished. The Nazis later compensated the few that had been tried or even jailed, and they merged the Gardekavallerie into the SA (Sturmabteilung). In an interview given to "Der Spiegel" in 1962 and in his memoirs Pabst maintained that he had talked on the phone with Noske in the Chancellery.[14] Noske and Ebert had approved of his actions. Pabst's statement was never confirmed, especially since neither parliament nor the courts had examined the case.

After the murders of 15 January the opposition between SPD and KPD grew even more irreconcilable. In the following years in the Weimar Republic, both parties could not decide on joint action against the Nazis (NSDAP) which was growing in strength as of 1930.

Further revolts in tow of the revolution
In the first months of 1919 there were further armed revolts all over Germany. In some states Councils Republics were proclaimed and existed, most prominently in Bavaria (Munich Soviet Republic), even if only temporarily.

These revolts were triggered by Noske's decision end of February to take armed action against the Council Republic of Bremen. In spite of an offer to negotiate he ordered his Freikorps units to invade the city. Approximately 400 people were killed in the ensuing fights.

This caused an eruption of mass strikes in the Ruhr District, the Rhineland and in Saxony. Members of the USPD, the KPD and even the SPD called for a general strike which started on 4 March. Against the will of the strike leadership the strikes escalated into street fighting in Berlin. The Prussian state government, which in the meantime had declared a state of siege, called the Imperial government for help. Again Noske employed the Gardekavallerie-Schützendivision commanded by Pabst against the strikers in Berlin. By the end of the fighting on 16 March they had killed approximately 1,200 people, many of them unarmed and uninvolved. Amongst others 29 members of the Peoples Navy Division, who had surrendered, were arbitrarily executed as Noske had ordered anybody found armed to be shot on the spot.

The situation in Hamburg and Thuringia also was very much like a civil war. The Council Government holding out the longest was the Munich Soviet Republic. It was only on 2 May that Prussian and Wurttemberg Freikorps units put an end using the same violent methods as in Berlin and Bremen.

According to modern predominating opinion of historians[15] a Bolshevik-style council dictatorship was impossible to be established on 9./10. November. Yet the Ebert Government felt threatened by a coup from the left and co-operated with the Supreme Command and the Freikorps. The brutal actions of the Freikorps during the various revolts estranged many left democrats from the SPD. They, especially of course the USPD and the KPD, regard Ebert's, Noske's and the other SPD leader's behaviour during the revolution to this very day outright as betrayal against their own followers.

National Assembly and New Imperial Constitution
Main article: Weimar National Assembly

On 19 January a Constituent National Assembly (Verfassungsgebende Nationalversammlung) was elected. Aside from SPD and USPD, the catholic Centre Party (Zentrumspartei) and several middle-class parties took part, which had established themselves since November: the left-liberal German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei DDP), the national-liberal German Peoples Party (Deutsche Volkspartei DVP) and the conservative, nationalist German National Peoples Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei DNVP). In spite of Rosa Luxemburg's recommendation, the KPD did not participate in these elections.

The SPD became the strongest party in the Reichstag with 37.4% and 165 out of 423 deputies. The USPD received only 7.6 % and sent 22 deputies into the parliament. The rating of the USPD temporarily went up one more time after the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch in 1920 but the party then dissolved in 1922. The Centre Party was runner-up to the SPD with 91 deputies, the DDP had 75, the DVP 19 and the DNVP 44. As a result, the SPD formed the so-called Weimar Coalition with the Centre Party and the DDP. To get away from the post-revolutionary confusion in Berlin the National Assembly met on 6 February in the town of Weimar, Thuringia, some 250 km to the southwest of Berlin, where Friedrich Ebert was elected temporary Reich President on 11 February and Philipp Scheidemann was elected as Prime Minister (Ministerpräsident) of the newly-formed coalition on 13 February. Ebert was then constitutionally sworn in as President (Reichspräsident) on 21 August 1919.

On the one hand, the Weimar Constitution offered more possibilites of a direct democracy than the present German constitution, like for instance a referendum. On the other hand, Article 48 granted the President the authority to rule against the majority in the Parliament, with the help of the army if need be. In 1932-33, article 48 was instrumental in destroying German democracy.[16]

Aftermath
Main article: Weimar Republic

From 1920 to 1923, nationalist forces continued fighting against the Weimar Republic and left-wing political opponents. In 1920, the German government was briefly overthrown by a coup by Wolfgang Kapp in the Kapp Putsch and a nationalist government was briefly in power, until mass public demonstrations forced the short-lived regime out of power. In 1921 and 1922, Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau were shot by members of the ultra-nationalist Organisation Consul. The newly formed Nazi Party under leadership of Adolf Hitler and support of former German army chief Erich von Ludendorff, entered into the political violence against the government and left-wing political forces as well. In 1923, in what is now known as the Beer Hall Putsch, the Nazis took control of parts of Munich, arresting the President of Bavaria, the chief of police, and others and forcing them to sign an agreement in which they endorsed the Nazi takeover and endorsed the Nazis objective to overthrow the German government. The putsch came to an end when the German army and police were called in to put down the putsch resulting in an armed confrontation where a number of Nazis and some police were killed.

The Republic was under great pressure from both left and right-wing extremists. The radical left accused the ruling Social Democrats of having betrayed the ideals of the workers' movement by preventing a communist revolution by unleashing the Freikorps upon the workers. Right-wing extremists were opposed to any democratic system, preferring an authoritarian state like the 1871 Empire. To further undermine the Republic's credibility, right-wing extremists (especially certain members of the former officer corps) used the Dolchstoßlegende for blaming an alleged conspiracy of Socialists and Jews for Germany's defeat in World War I. Both parties would make reckless use of the freedoms guaranteed by the new constitution in their fight against the Weimar Republic. It came to an end with the ascent of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

Contemporary statements and historical research Political developments in the Weimar Republic
The Revolution of 1918/19 is one of the most important events in the later history of Germany, yet it is poorly embedded in the historical memory of Germans. The failure of the Weimar Republic which this revolution brought forth and the following Nazi-era have obstructed the view of these events for a long time. To this very day, the interpretation of these events has been determined more by legends than by facts.

Both the radical right and the radical left-–under different circumstances—nurtured the idea that a Communist uprising was aiming to establish a Soviet Republic following the Russian example. The democratic centre parties, especially the SPD, were also barely interested in fairly assessing the events which turned Germany into a Republic. At closer look these events turn out to be a revolution supported by the Social Democrats and stopped by their party leadership. These processes helped to weaken the Weimar Republic from its very beginning.

After the Imperial Government and the Supreme Command shirked their responsibilities for the war and the defeat at an early stage, the majority parties of the Reichstag were left to cope with the resulting burdens. In his autobiography, Ludendorff's successor Groener states: "It suited me just fine, when the army and the Supreme Command remained as guiltless as possible in these wretched truce negotiations, from which nothing good could be expected".[8]

Thus, the "Myth of the Stab in the Back" was born according to which the revolutionaries stabbed the army, "undefeated on the field", in the back and only then turning the almost secure victory into a defeat. It was mainly Ludendorff who contributed to the spread of this falsification of history to conceal his own role in the defeat. In nationalistic and national minded circles the myth fell on fertile ground. They soon defamed the revolutionaries and even politicians like Ebert, who never wanted the revolution and had done everything to channel and contain it, as "November Criminals" (Novemberverbrecher). In 1923, Hitler and Ludendorf deliberately chose symbolic 9 November as the date of their attempted "Beer Hall Putsch".

From its very beginning the republic was afflicted with the stigma of the military defeat. A large part of the bourgeoisie and the old elites from big industry, landowners, military, judiciary and administration never accepted the democratic republic, but intended to get rid of the new type of state at the first opportunity. On the left the actions of the SPD Leadership during the revolution drove many of its former adherents to the Communists. The contained revolution gave birth to a "democracy without democrats" .[17]

Contemporary statements
Depending on their political standpoint of view, contemporaries had greatly differing opinions about the revolution.

Ernst Troeltsch, a Protestant theologian and philosopher, rather calmly remarked how the majority of Berlin citizens perceived 10 November:

"On Sunday morning after a frightful night the morning newspapers gave a clear picture: the Kaiser in Holland, the revolution victorious in most urban centres, the royals in the states abdicating. No man dead for Kaiser and Empire! The continuation of duties ensured and no run on the banks! (…) Trams and subways ran as usual which is a pledge that basic needs are cared for. On all faces it could be read: Wages will continue to be paid".[18]

The liberal publicist Theodor Wolff wrote on the very day of 10 November in the newspaper Berliner Tageblatt, lending himself to far too optimistic illusions, which the SPD leadership also might have had:

"Like a sudden storm, the biggest of all revolutions has toppled the imperial regime including everything that belonged to it. It can be called the greatest of all revolutions because never has a more firmly built (…) fortress been taken in this manner at the first attempt. Only one week ago, there was still a military and civil administration so deeply rooted that it seemed to have secured its dominion beyond the change of times. (…) Only yesterday morning, at least in Berlin, all this still existed. Yesterday afternoon it was all gone".[19]

The extreme right had a completely opposite perception. On 10 November, conservative journalist Paul Baecker wrote an article in Deutsche Tageszeitung which already contained essential elements of the stab-in-the-back legend:

"The work fought for by our fathers with their precious blood – dismissed by betrayal in the ranks of our own people! Germany, yesterday still undefeated, left to the mercy of our enemies by men carrying the German name, by felony out of our own ranks broken down in guilt and shame.
The German Socialists knew that peace was at hand anyway and that it was only about holding out against the enemy for a few days or weeks in order to wrest bearable conditions from them. In this situation they raised the white flag.
This is a sin that can never be forgiven and never will be forgiven. This is treason not only against the monarchy and the army but also against the German people themselves who will have to bear the consequences in centuries of decline and of misery".
[20]

In an article on the 10th anniversary of the revolution the publicist Kurt Tucholsky remarked that neither Wolff nor Baecker were right. Nevertheless Tucholsky did accuse Ebert and Noske of betrayal-–not of the monarchy but of the revolution. Although he wanted to regard it as only a coup (d'état) he analysed the actual course of events more clearly than most of his contemporaries. In 1928 he wrote in "November Coup":

"The German Revolution of 1918 took place in a hall."

"The things taking place were not a revolution. There was no spiritual preparation, no leaders ready in the dark; no revolutionary goals. The mother of this revolution was the soldiers' longing to be home for Christmas. And weariness, disgust and weariness."

"The possibilities that nevertheless were lying in the streets were betrayed by Ebert and his like. Fritz* Ebert, whom you cannot heighten to a personality by calling him Friedrich opposed the establishment of a republic only until he found there was a post of chairman to be had; comrade Scheidemann è tutti quanti all were would-be senior civil servants." (* Fritz is the colloquial term for Friedrich like Willy – William)

"The following possibilities were left out: shattering federal states, division of landed property, revolutionary socialization of industry, reform of administrative and judiciary personnel. A republican constitution in which every sentence rescinds the next one, a revolution talking about well acquired rights of the old regime can be only laughed at."

"The German Revolution is still to take place."[21]

Walter Rathenau was of a similar opinion. He called the revolution a "disappointment", a "present by chance", a "product of desperation", a "revolution by mistake". It did not deserve this name because it did "not abolish the actual mistakes" but "degenerated into a degrading clash of interests".

"Not a chain was broken by the swelling of spirit and will, but a lock merely rusted through. The chain fell off and the freed stood amazed, helpless, embarrassed and needed to arm against their will. The ones sensing their advantage were the quickest."[22]

The historian and publicist Sebastian Haffner in turn came out against Tucholsky and Rathenau. He lived through the revolution in Berlin as a child and wrote 50 years later in his book "Der Verrat" (The Betrayal) about one of the myths around the events of November 1918 which had taken root especially in the bourgeoisie:

"It is often said that a true revolution in Germany in 1918 never took place. All that really happened was a breakdown. It was only the temporary weakness of the police and army in the moment of military defeat which let a mutiny of sailors appear as a revolution.
At first sight, one can see how wrong and blind this is comparing 1918 with 1945. In 1945 there really was a breakdown.
Certainly a mutiny of sailors started the revolution in 1918 but it was only a start. What made it extraordinary is that a mere sailors' mutiny triggered an earthquake which shook all of Germany; that the whole home army, the whole urban workforce and in Bavaria a part of the rural population rose up in revolt. This revolt was not just a mutiny anymore, it was a true revolution. (…)
As in any revolution, the old order was replaced by the beginnings of a new one. It was not only destructive but also creative. (…)
As a revolutionary achievement of masses the German November 1918 does not need to take second place to either the French July 1789 or the Russian March 1917."
[23]

Historical research
During the Nazi regime, works on the Weimar Republic and the German Revolution published abroad and by emigrants in the 1930s and 1940s could not be read in Germany. Around 1935 this affected the first published History of the Weimar Republic by Arthur Rosenberg. In his view the political situation at the beginning of the revolution was open: The moderate socialist and democratic oriented work force indeed had a chance to become the actual social foundation of the republic and to drive back the conservative forces. On one hand this failed because of the wrong decisions of the SPD-Leadership, on the other because of the revolutionary tactics employed by the extreme left wing of the work force.

After 1945 West German historical research on the Weimar Republic concentrated most of all on its decline. In 1951, Theodor Eschenburg ignored the revolutionary beginning of the republic to a great extent. In 1955, Karl Dietrich Bracher also dealt with the German Revolution from the perspective of the failed republic. Erich Eyck e. g. shows how little the revolution after 1945 was regarded as part of German history. In his two volume History of the Weimar Republic he barely dedicated 20 pages to these events. The same can be said for Karl Dietrich Erdmann's contribution to the 8th edition of the Gebhardt Handbook for German History (Gebhardtsches Handbuch zur Deutschen Geschichte), whose viewpoint dominated the interpretation of the events around the German Revolution after 1945. According to Erdmann 1918/19 was about the choice between "social revolution in line with forces demanding a proletarian dictatorship and parliamentary republic in line with the conservative elements like the German officer corps".[24] As the majority Social Democrats were forced to join up with the old elites to prevent an imminent council dictatorship, the blame for the failure of the Weimar Republic was to be put on the extreme left. According to this view, the events of 1918/19 were successful defensive actions of democracy against Bolshevism.

This interpretation at the height of the Cold War is based on the assumption that the extreme left was comparably strong and a real threat to the democratic development. In this point, West German researchers ironically found themselves in line with Marxist historiography in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which attributed considerable revolutionary potential most of all to the Spartacists. While in the post war years the majority SPD (MSPD) was cleared of its Nazi odium as "November Criminals", GDR historians blamed the SPD for "betrayal of the working class" and the USPD leadership for their incompetence. Their interpretation was mainly based on the 1958 theories of the Central Committee of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) according to which the German Revolution was defined as a "bourgeois-democratic revolution", lead in certain aspects with proletarian means and methods. The fact that a revolution by the working class in Germany never happened can be put down to the "subjective factor", especially the missing of a "Marxist-Leninist offensive party". Contrary to the official party line, Rudolf Lindau supported the theory that the German Revolution had a Socialist tendency. Consistently the founding of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) was declared to be the decisive turning point in German history. But in spite of ideological bias historical research in the GDR expanded detailed knowledge of the German Revolution.[25]

During the 1950s, West German historians focused their research on the final stages of the Weimar Republic. In the 1960s, they shifted to its revolutionary beginnings, realizing that the decisions and developments during the revolution were central to the failure of the first German Republic. Especially the Worker's and Soldier's Councils moved into focus and their previous appearance as a far leftwing movement had to be revised extensively. Authors like Ulrich Kluge, Eberhard Kolb, Reinhard Rürup and others argued that in the first weeks of the revolution the social base for a democratic redesign of society was much stronger than previously thought and that the potential of the extreme left was actually weaker than the MSPD-Leadership, for example, assumed. As "Bolshevism" posed no real threat the scope of action for the Council of the People's Deputies (also supported by the yet reform orientated councils) to consistently democratise the administration, military and society had been relatively large. But the MSPD-Leadership did not take that step because it trusted in the loyalty of the old elites but mistrusted the spontaneous mass movements in the first weeks of the revolution. The result of this was the resignation and radicalisation of the council movement. These theories have been supported by the publications of the minutes of the Council of the People's Deputies. More and more the history of the German Revolution appeared as the history of its gradual reversal.

This new interpretation of the German Revolution gained acceptance in research rather quickly even though older perceptions remained alive. Research concerning the composition of the Worker's and Soldier's Councils which today can be easily verified by sources is undisputed to a large extent. But the interpretation of the revolutionary events based on this research has been already criticized and partially modified since the end of the 1970s. Criticism was aimed at the partially idealized description of the Worker's and Soldier's Councils which especially was the case in the wake of the German Student Movement of 1960s (1968). Peter von Oertzen went particularly far in this respect describing a social democracy based on councils as a positive alternative to the bourgeois republic. In comparison Wolfgang J. Mommsen did not regard the councils as a homogenous focussed movement for democracy but as a heterogeneous group with a multitude of different motivations and goals. Jesse and Köhler even talked about the "construct of a democratic council movement". Certainly these authors also excluded a "relapse to the positions of the 1950s: "The councils were neither communist orientated to a large extent nor can the policies of the majority SPD in every aspect be labelled fortuitous and worth praising."[26]

Heinrich August Winkler tried to find a compromise, according to which the Social Democrats depended to a limited extent on the cooperation with the old elites, but went considerably further than necessary: "With more political willpower they could have changed more and preserved less."[27] With all the differences concerning details, historical researchers agree that in the German Revolution, the chances to put the republic on a firm footing were considerably better than the dangers coming from the extreme left. Instead, the alliance of the SPD with the old elites constituted a considerable structural problem for the Weimar Republic.[28]
UNQUOTE
It is all there somewhere - maybe. It pays to know where the writer is coming from but the bare bones of it are likely to be sound. Motives are another matter. Then there is what is not said. Communists were keen to regard Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht as victims. Others see them as chancers who came unstuck. The world is a better place without them. Had they won the Iron Curtain would have been erected on the French border or even at Calais. The further reading section in the Wiki article has a communist bias.