Jews Made America Go To War
This confirms what a lot of people suspect; that the Jews use politicians to
make war when it serves their agenda. They were recently trying to make America
attack Iran without much luck. Even American politicians realize that it would
cut off
Oil from the Middle East. This would hurt all American
voters, cost too many votes. They are not quite that stupid. Bribery is very
effective, blackmail ditto. That is why they pander to Zion. Being the party
that brought in $1,000 oil would be their death knell.
In fact the Jews have gone quiet about Iran
for the moment [ June 2011 ]. They have set up a war on
Libya instead. Naturally they are using Americans, Brits, French, whatever.
They save their own blood for other things.
NB The source is David Irving who is not
necessarily reliable. The letter from Weizmann is only a part. The signature
could be anyone's. No source is given. It might be genuine. There again it might
not. It is important to check his claims. It will happen.
http://middleeastrealitycheck.blogspot.com/2010/01/churchill-no-quarter-for-zionists.html
http://www.jewishmag.com/60mag/weizmann/weizmann.htm
http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/Churchill/Weizmann_Zionists/OSS_1244.html
http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/Churchill/Weizmann_Zionists/bribe_King_Saud_1943.html
http://www.stljewishlight.com/news/local/article_861b851a-eb1b-5461-8b33-026a3c5c08df.html
http://www.mucjs.org/EXHIBITION/8LASKI.HTML
http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp?id=603
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x859086
From
Zionist Jew Promised to Bring America Into the War
-
http://sixmillionlies.blogspot.com/2011/05/zionist-jew-promised-to-bring-america.html
Zionist Jew Promised to Bring America Into the War
Chaim Weizmann,
scheming Zionist powerbroker
Valiant British historian David Irving
unearthed Churchill's secret correspondence with Zionist
leader/activist, and first President of Israel, Chaim Weizmann .
Concealed in a letter to Churchill, Irving discovered that Weizmann
pledged to Churchill that American Jewry would bring the U.S. into
World War II on the side of England, if Churchill would promise to
create a Jewish state in Palestine thus fulfilling the Balfour
Declaration signed by the British in 1917. Not only this but Weizmann
bragged about how the Jews had brought America into the first World
War, and could easily do it again.
click for
larger view
The Weizmann
letter to Churchill
VIDEO
WAR CABINET 102 (41).CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting
of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street,S.W. 1, on Monday, October 13,
1941, at 5 p.m.Present: The Right Hon. Winston S.
Churchill , M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair). The Right Hon. C. R.
Attlee, M.P.,
Former reference: WM (41) 102
Date: 1941 Source: Documents Online
(Cabinet Office papers)
of this document.WAR CABINET 99
(41).CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister'room,
House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Thursday, October 2, 1941, at12 15 p.m.Present:The
Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill , M.P.,
Prime Minister (in
Former reference: WM (41) 99
Date: 1941 Source: DocumentsOnline
(Cabinet Office papers)
War Cabinet Meeting 19411013
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street,
S.W. 1, on Monday, October 13, 1 9 4 1 , at 5 P.M.
Palestine.
Eecruitment of
Jewish Units
for Service in
the British
Army.
(Previous
Eeference:
W.M. (41) 99th
Conclusions,
Minute 2.)
2. In connection with an inaccurate statement broadcast by
the B.B.C. as l o the Moscow Conference (see Telegram No. 1279
from Moscow^ the Minister of Information undertook to
circulate
to the War Cabinet a paper showing the present organisation of
the B.B.C. and what it would be a f t e r the intended
reorganisation
had taken place.
3. The Minister of Home Security reported that on the
previous night enemy bombing had been widespread in Lancashire
and Yorkshire, but not on a heavy scale. Thirteen people h a d
been
killed at Oldham and 200 rendered homeless. The total casualties
reported for the night had been 18 killed and 123 seriously
injured.
The War Cabinet took note of the above statement.
4. After a short discussion as to whether the time and place
of meetings of Parliament should be made public beforehand, the
War Cabinet agreed—
To adhere to the present practice whereby such information
was not published in advance.
5. The War Cabinet had a short discussion as- to whether
P a r l i a m e n t should adjourn for a fortnight towards the
end of this
month.
The W a r C a b i n e t (
1) Agreed that such a n adjournment was most desirable, and
took note t h a t the P a r t y Leaders would endeavour to
secure its ready acceptance.
(2) Agreed that, in this event, the present Session should be
brought to an end on the 11th November and a new
Session begun on the following day.
6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies (W.P. (G) (41) 105
(Revise)).
The main points in this Memorandum, which set out the results of
consultations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
the
Minister of State and the Secretary of State for War, were as
follows :—
(i) While the raising of Jewish contingents, p a r t l y in the
, U n i t e d States, would be open to some political objection,
t h e matter should be decided on m i l i t a r y grounds.
(ii) The Secretary of State for War opposed the scheme
strongly on military grounds, namely, that, in the
present Supply situation, we could not spare equipment
for troops of doubtful value.
(iii) As an alternative to refusal, we might accept
Dr. Weizmann's offer if war service of a different kind
could be substituted, e.g., technical personnel of
various
types for which
6. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies (W.P. (G) (41) 105
(Revise)).
The main points in this Memorandum, which set out the results of
consultations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
the
Minister of State and the Secretary of State for War, were as
follows :—
(i) While the raising of Jewish contingents, p a r t l y in the
, U n i t e d States, would be open to some political objection,
t h e matter should be decided on m i l i t a r y grounds.
(ii) The Secretary of State for War opposed the scheme
strongly on military grounds, namely, that, in the
present Supply situation, we could not spare equipment
for troops of doubtful value.
(iii) As an alternative to refusal, we might accept
Dr. Weizmann's offer if war service of a different kind
could be substituted, e.g., technical personnel of
various
types for which there was a n unsatisfied demand for war
purposes.
The following were the main points made in discussion :—
(1) I t was not possible to defer a decision again. Indeed,
Dr. Weizmann had said that he would prefer a definite
refusal to further postponement.
(2) I t was, of course, open to Jews to enlist in American,
Canadian or B r i t i s h Units, and many had done so. But
it was understandable that the Jews, who had been so
harshly attacked by Nazi Germany, should wish to see
specifically Jewish u n i t s raised.
(3) Although Dr. Weizmann and his supporters were not now
asking that the proposed Jewish Units should be
stationed in Palestine, this demand was certain to come
later on. Some of Dr. WeizmamVs supporters, indeed,
hardly, troubled to disguise the fact t h a t a Jewish army
would be useful after the war in securing a settlement
of the P a l e s t i n i a n question on Zionist lines.
(4) Nevertheless, on balance there was much to be said for
meeting the present demand by increasing the enrolment
of Jews in Palestine. The Secretary- of State for the
Colonies said that the rule formerly in force, whereby
p a r i t y was maintained between Arabs and Jews in the
recruitment of the P a l e s t i n i a n Forces, h a d been
changed.
No limit was now imposed. There were to-day 17,000
Jews in the P a l e s t i n e Police and Defence Forces.
(5) To carry this process further would not involve us in any
serious political difficulties; it would save transportation;
and it had the strong logical justification that it
would be wrong to refuse the Palestinian Jews the
means to defend themselves if the war reached Palestine.
(6) I t must not be taken as certain that the recruitment of
Jewish Units for general service would meet with a
favourable political reception in the United States. In
any case, the P a l e s t i n i a n Jews were a better field of
recruitment.
The W a r C a b i n e t
(
a)
Decided
against the adoption of a scheme for the recruitment
of Jewish U n i t s for general service on the lines
summarised in p a r a g r a p h 3 of W.P. (G) (41) 105.
(b) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to
encourage
the enrolment of additional P a l e s t i n i a n Jews u p to,
say,
5,000 to 10,000 men, in the military and police forces
i n P a l e s t i n e p r i m a r i l y for purposes of local
defence. If
practicable, it would be desirable that a few purely
Jewish u n i t s should be formed, provided that this could
be done without undue publicity.
(c) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies, when
communicating
this decision to Dr. Weizmann, to inform
h im t h a t the three Defence services in t h i s country were
in urgent need of skilled technical personnel, and that
we should welcome the help to our war effort which
would result from t h e recruitment of Jewish technicians.