Churchill
was our war time prime minister, highly praised and generally well thought of
but there are dissenters. One such is #David
Irving, an historian of the Second World War
who speaks German. The Wiki is hostile to our historian but Ron Unz
thinks well of his writing. I am less confident; but not
because of the Wiki or Lipman's allegations. Other views are at
#Churchill Explained
If someone is lavishly praised it pays to ask
why. Does WSC deserve it or do the Mainstream Media have
ulterior motives? They often do. Ron's criticisms seem well founded, even though
he is following Irving on this. Here is
part of a lengthy article
#American
Pravda Understanding World War II, by Ron Unz where Ron tells us:
QUOTE My impression is that individuals of low personal
character are those most likely to sell out the interests of their own
country in exchange for large sums of foreign money, and as such usually
constitute the natural targets of nefarious plotters and foreign spies.
Churchill certainly seems to fall into this category, with rumors of massive
personal corruption swirling around him from early in his political career.
Later, he supplemented his income by engaging in widespread art-forgery, a
fact that Roosevelt later discovered and probably used as a point of
personal leverage against him. Also quite serious was Churchill’s constant
state of drunkenness, with his inebriation being so widespread as to
constitute clinical alcoholism. Indeed, Irving notes that in his private
conversations FDR routinely referred to Churchill as “a drunken bum.”
UNQUOTE
The Atlantic covers the ground with
Why Winston Churchill Was So Bad With Money
American Pravda Understanding World War II, by Ron Unz
Until
recently, my [ Ron's ] familiarity with Churchill had been rather cursory, and
Irving’s revelations were absolutely eye-opening. Perhaps the most striking
single discovery was the remarkable venality and corruption of the man, with
Churchill being a huge spendthrift who lived lavishly and often far beyond
his financial means, employing an army of dozens of personal servants at his
large country estate despite frequently lacking any regular and assured
sources of income to maintain them. This predicament naturally put him at
the mercy of those individuals willing to support his sumptuous lifestyle in
exchange for determining his political activities. And somewhat similar
pecuniary means were used to secure the backing of a network of other
political figures from across all the British parties, who became
Churchill’s close political allies.
To put
things in plain language, during the years leading up to the Second World
War, both Churchill and numerous other fellow British MPs were regularly
receiving sizable financial stipends—cash bribes—from Jewish and Czech
sources in exchange for promoting a policy of extreme hostility toward the
German government and actually advocating war. The sums involved were quite
considerable, with the Czech government alone probably making payments that
amounted to tens of millions of dollars in present-day money to British
elected officials, publishers, and journalists working to overturn the
official peace policy of their existing government. A particularly notable
instance occurred in early 1938 when Churchill suddenly lost all his
accumulated wealth in a foolish gamble on the American stock-market, and was
soon forced to put his beloved country estate up for sale to avoid personal
bankruptcy, only to quickly be bailed out by a foreign Jewish millionaire [Henry
Strakosch ]
intent upon promoting a war against Germany. Indeed, the early stages of
Churchill’s involvement in this sordid behavior are recounted in an Irving
chapter aptly entitled “The Hired Help.”
Ironically enough, German Intelligence learned of this massive bribery of
British parliamentarians, and passed the information along to Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain, who was horrified to discover the corrupt motives of
his fierce political opponents, but apparently remained too much of a
gentlemen to have them arrested and prosecuted. I’m no expert in the British
laws of that era, but for elected officials to do the bidding of foreigners
on matters of war and peace in exchange for huge secret payments seems
almost a textbook example of treason to me, and I think that Churchill’s
timely execution would surely have saved tens of millions of lives.
My impression is that individuals of low
personal character are those most likely to sell out the interests of their
own country in exchange for large sums of foreign money, and as such usually
constitute the natural targets of nefarious plotters and foreign spies.
Churchill certainly seems to fall into this category, with rumors of massive
personal corruption swirling around him from early in his political career.
Later, he supplemented his income by engaging in widespread art-forgery, a
fact that Roosevelt later discovered and probably used as a point of
personal leverage against him. Also quite serious was Churchill’s constant
state of drunkenness, with his inebriation being so widespread as to
constitute clinical alcoholism. Indeed, Irving notes that in his private
conversations FDR routinely referred to Churchill as “a drunken bum.”
During
the late 1930s, Churchill and his clique of similarly bought-and-paid-for
political allies had endlessly attacked and denounced Chamberlain’s
government for its peace policy, and he regularly made the wildest sort of
unsubstantiated accusations, claiming the Germans were undertaking a huge
military build-up aimed against Britain. These roiling charges were often
widely echoed by a media heavily influenced by Jewish interests and did much
to poison the state of German-British relations. Eventually, these
accumulated pressures forced Chamberlain into the extremely unwise act of
providing an unconditional guarantee of military backing to Poland’s
irresponsible dictatorship. As a result, the Poles then rather arrogantly
refused any border negotiations with Germany, thereby lighting the fuse
which eventually led to the German invasion six months later and the
subsequent British declaration of war. The British media had widely promoted
Churchill as the leading pro-war political figure, and once Chamberlain was
forced to create a wartime government of national unity, his leading critic
was brought into it and given the naval affairs portfolio.
Following his lightening six-week defeat of Poland, Hitler unsuccessfully
sought to make peace with the Allies, and the war went into abeyance. Then
in early 1940, Churchill persuaded his government to try strategically
outflanking the Germans by preparing a large sea-borne invasion of neutral
Norway; but Hitler discovered the plan and preempted the attack, with
Churchill’s severe operational mistakes leading to a surprising defeat for
the vastly superior British forces. During World War I, Churchill’s
Gallipoli disaster had forced his resignation from the British Cabinet, but
this time the friendly media helped ensure that all the blame for the
somewhat similar debacle at Narvik was foisted upon Chamberlain, so it was
the latter who was forced to resign, with Churchill then replacing him as
prime minister. British naval officers were appalled that the primary
architect of their humiliation had become its leading political beneficiary,
but reality is what the media reports, and the British public never
discovered this great irony.
This
incident was merely the first of the long series of Churchill’s major
military failures and outright betrayals that are persuasively recounted by
Irving, nearly all of which were subsequently airbrushed out of our
hagiographic histories of the conflict. We should recognize that wartime
leaders who spend much of their time in a state of drunken stupor are far
less likely to make optimal decisions, especially if they are as extremely
prone to military micro-management as was the case with Churchill.
In the
spring of 1940, the Germans launched their sudden armored thrust into France
via Belgium, and as the attack began to succeed, Churchill ordered the
commanding British general to immediately flee with his forces to the coast
and to do so without informing his French or Belgium counterparts of the
huge gap he was thereby opening in the Allied front-lines, thus ensuring the
encirclement and destruction of their armies. Following France’s resulting
defeat and occupation, the British prime minister then ordered a sudden,
surprise attack on the disarmed French fleet, completely destroying it and
killing some 2,000 of his erstwhile allies; the immediate cause was his
mistranslation of a single French word, but this “Pearl Harbor-type”
incident continued to rankle French leaders for decades.
Hitler
had always wanted friendly relations with Britain and certainly had sought
to avoid the war that had been forced upon him. With France now defeated and
British forces driven from the Continent, he therefore offered very
magnanimous peace terms and a new German alliance to Britain. The British
government had been pressured into entering the war for no logical reason
and against its own national interests, so Chamberlain and half the Cabinet
naturally supported commencing peace negotiations, and the German proposal
probably would have received overwhelming approval both from the British
public and political elites if they had ever been informed of its terms.
But
despite some occasional wavering, Churchill remained absolutely adamant that
the war must continue, and Irving plausibly argues that his motive was an
intensely personal one. Across his long career, Churchill had had a
remarkable record of repeated failure, and for him to have finally achieved
his lifelong ambition of becoming prime minister only to lose a major war
just weeks after reaching Number 10 Downing Street would have ensured that
his permanent place in history was an extremely humiliating one. On the
other hand, if he managed to continue the war, perhaps the situation might
somehow later improve, especially if the Americans could be persuaded to
eventually enter the conflict on the British side.
Since
ending the war with Germany was in his nation’s interest but not his own,
Churchill undertook ruthless means to prevent peace sentiments from growing
so strong that they overwhelmed his opposition. Along with most other major
countries, Britain and Germany had signed international conventions
prohibiting the aerial bombardment of civilian urban targets, and although
the British leader had very much hoped the Germans would attack his cities,
Hitler scrupulously followed these provisions. In desperation, Churchill
therefore ordered a series of large-scale bombing raids against the German
capital of Berlin, doing considerable damage, and after numerous severe
warnings, Hitler finally began to retaliate with similar attacks against
British cities. The population saw the heavy destruction inflicted by these
German bombing raids and was never informed of the British attacks that had
preceded and provoked them, so public sentiment greatly hardened against
making peace with the seemingly diabolical German adversary.
In his
memoirs published a half-century later, Prof. Revilo P. Oliver, who had
held a senior wartime role in American Military Intelligence, described this
sequence of events in very bitter terms:
Great Britain, in violation of all the ethics of civilized warfare that
had theretofore been respected by our race, and in treacherous violation
of solemnly assumed diplomatic covenants about “open cities”, had
secretly carried out intensive bombing of such open cities in Germany
for the express purpose of killing enough unarmed and defenceless men
and women to force the German government reluctantly to retaliate and
bomb British cities and thus kill enough helpless British men, women,
and children to generate among Englishmen enthusiasm for the insane war
to which their government had committed them.
It
is impossible to imagine a governmental act more vile and more depraved
than contriving death and suffering for its own people — for the very
citizens whom it was exhorting to “loyalty” — and I suspect that an act
of such infamous and savage treason would have nauseated even
Genghis Khan or
Hulagu or
Tamerlane, Oriental barbarians universally reprobated
for their insane blood-lust. History, so far as I recall, does not
record that they ever butchered their own women and children to
facilitate lying propaganda….In 1944 members of British Military
Intelligence took it for granted that after the war Marshal Sir Arthur
Harris would be hanged or shot for high treason against the British
people…
Churchill’s ruthless violation of the laws of war regarding urban aerial
bombardment directly led to the destruction of many of Europe’s finest and
most ancient cities. But perhaps influenced by his chronic drunkenness, he
later sought to carry out even more horrifying war crimes and was only
prevented from doing so by the dogged opposition of all his military and
political subordinates.
Along
with the laws prohibiting the bombing of cities, all nations had similarly
agreed to ban the first use of poison gas, while stockpiling quantities for
necessary retaliation. Since Germany was the world-leader in chemistry, the
Nazis had produced the most lethal forms of new nerve gases, such as Tabun
and Sarin, whose use might have easily resulted in major military victories
on both the Eastern and Western fronts, but Hitler had scrupulously obeyed
the international protocols that his nation had signed. However, late in the
war during 1944 the relentless Allied bombardment of German cities led to
the devastating retaliatory attacks of the V-1 flying bombs against London,
and an outraged Churchill became adamant that German cities should be
attacked with poison gas in counter-retaliation. If Churchill had gotten his
way, many millions of British might soon have perished from German nerve gas
counter-strikes. Around the same time, Churchill was also blocked in his
proposal to bombard Germany with hundreds of thousands of deadly anthrax
bombs, an operation that might have rendered much of Central and Western
Europe uninhabitable for generations.
I found
Irving’s revelations on all these matters absolutely astonishing, and was
deeply grateful that Deborah Lipstadt and her army of diligent researchers
had carefully investigated and seemingly confirmed the accuracy of virtually
every single item.
The two
existing volumes of Irving’s Churchill masterwork total well over 700,000
words, and reading them would obviously consume weeks of dedicated effort.
Fortunately, Irving is also a riveting speaker and several of his extended
lectures on the topic are available for viewing on BitChute after having
been recently purged from YouTube:
Out of office during the 1930s, Churchill took the lead in calling for
British rearmament to counter the
growing threat from
Nazi Germany. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was
re-appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. In 1940 he became prime minister,
replacing
Neville Chamberlain. Churchill oversaw British involvement in the
Allied war effort against Germany and the
Axis
powers, resulting in victory in 1945. His wartime leadership was widely
praised, although acts like the
Bombing of Dresden and his wartime response to the
Bengal famine generated controversy. After the Conservatives' defeat in
the
1945 general election, he became
Leader of the Opposition. Amid the developing
Cold War
with the
Soviet Union, he publicly warned of an "iron
curtain" of Soviet influence in Europe and promoted European unity.
Re-elected Prime Minister in
1951, his second term was preoccupied with foreign affairs, including
the
Malayan Emergency,
Mau Mau Uprising,
Korean
War, and a UK-backed
Iranian coup. Domestically his government emphasised house-building and
developed a nuclear weapon. In declining health, Churchill resigned as prime
minister in 1955, although he remained an MP until
1964. Upon his death in 1965, he was given a
state funeral.
Widely considered one of the 20th century's most significant figures,
Churchill remains popular in the UK and Western world, where he is seen as a
victorious wartime leader who played an important role in defending Europe's
liberal democracy from the spread of
fascism.
Also praised as a social reformer and writer, among his many awards was the
Nobel Prize in Literature. Conversely, his imperialist views and
comments on race, as well as his sanctioning of human rights abuses in the
suppression of
anti-imperialist movements seeking independence from the
British Empire, have generated considerable controversy.
David Irving ex Wiki
David John Cawdell Irving (born 24 March 1938) is an English author and
Holocaust denier[1]
who has written on the military and political history of
World War II, with a focus on
Nazi Germany. His works include
The Destruction of Dresden (1963),
Hitler's War (1977), Churchill's War (1987) and Goebbels:
Mastermind of the Third Reich (1996). In his works, he argued that
Adolf Hitler did not know of the extermination of Jews or, if he did,
opposed it.[2]
Though Irving's
negationist views of German atrocities in World War II (and Hitler's
responsibility for them) were never taken seriously by mainstream
historians, he was once recognised for his knowledge of Nazi Germany and his
ability to unearth new historical documents.
Irving's reputation as a
historian was discredited[Note
2] when, in the course of an
unsuccessful libel case he filed against the American historian
Deborah Lipstadt and
Penguin Books, he was shown to have deliberately misrepresented
historical evidence to promote Holocaust denial.[Note
3] The English court found that Irving was an active Holocaust
denier,
antisemite and
racist,[5]
who "for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately
misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence".[5][6]
In addition, the court found that Irving's books had distorted the history
of Hitler's role in
the Holocaust to depict Hitler in a favourable light.
Its volunteers accuse the trust of “re-writing history”.......... A 1,400-word tribute that talked about a “much loved leader” with
“bulldog spirit” who had a love of brandy and cigars has also been axed.
A list of his achievements and full biography have also gone from the old
site — when the charity was The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust. it had featured a picture of him posing in his office with his
trademark cigar, while others showed him in Parliament. Now his face is not seen once - yet there are numerous pictures of the
chief executive Julia Weston and her board of trustees.
19 Sep 2016 ... Winston Churchill preparing
to give a speech over the radio, Washington ... and financier David
Lough recounts Churchill's fascinating financial ...
Sir Henry Strakosch GBE (9 May 1871 – 30
October 1943) was an Austrian-born British banker ... He was a member of
the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance during 1925 and
1926. ... of the private debts of Sir Winston Churchill, in 1938, has
been cited as evidence of Jewish involvement in British politics in ...
19 Sep 2016 ... Winston Churchill preparing
to give a speech over the radio, Washington ... and financier David
Lough recounts Churchill's fascinating financial ...
His book, Churchill and the Jews, was
published in Britain in June by Simon ... economic and financial, to
bear upon the Governments which persecute them.”*.
Martin Gilbert, Churchill and the Jews: A
Lifelong Friendship (New York: ... is not so well known and what
Churchill knew is that without funding from Germany, ...
28 Sep 2016 ... A fresh look at Churchill
and Jewry, from an address by Ronald I. Cohen ... who was of immense
help guiding Churchill's financial affairs in the ...
17 Feb 2011 ... From the start of the
persecution of the Jews in Germany, Churchill took ... and financial, to
bear upon the governments which persecute them'.
15 Feb 2016 ... Some of Churchill's
financial bounty came in the unlaundered (or lightly ... was with
bankers and businessmen of Jewish origin, among them Sir ...
8 Mar 2007 ... An article that Winston
Churchill wrote but then banned from publication because of its
“perverse” messages about the persecution of Jews has ...
11 Mar 2007 ... LONDON — An article from
1937 under the name of Winston Churchill that blamed Jews for their own
persecution has ruffled a long-held view ...
11 Dec 2014 ... Winston Churchill was one
of the fathers of the modern Middle East. ... and it was by no means
unusual for politicians to receive financial ...
Sir
Winston Churchill departs 10 Downing Street with his poodle. Associated
Press
No More Champagne:
Churchill and His Money by David Lough
In May of
1940, as French forces crumpled in the face of the Nazi
onslaught and the British anxiously scanned the skies for signs
of the dreaded invasion, the newly installed prime minister was
preoccupied with another pressing problem. Where would he get
the money to pay his bill from the shirtmaker? Britain’s
predicament was dire, but so was Winston Churchill’s. He owed
not just the shirtmaker, but the watchmaker, the wine merchants,
and the printers as well. He was overdrawn at the bank, he owed
interest payments on his debts, his taxes were conspicuously
late, and his publishers were clamoring for an overdue book on
which he had taken a large advance. Churchill would lead Britain
through the Blitz a few months later, but first he needed money.
Winston Churchill’s finances were a shambles for most of his
life. It was a state of affairs, as David Lough reveals in No
More Champagne: Churchill and His Money, entirely of
Churchill’s own making. Over the course of a tumultuous
political career spanning more than half a century and
encompassing two changes of party and a dozen cabinet positions,
including two stints as prime minister, Churchill spent money he
did not have—extravagantly.
He took lavish trips to sun himself in the Bahamas and to
yacht in the Mediterranean and to shoot in Normandy. He bought
cases of champagne and boxes of cigars, costly pink-silk
underclothes, and a succession of rickety houses. He embarked on
prodigal rebuilding projects that nearly proved his ruin.
Churchill, a friend reportedly remarked, was “easily satisfied
with the best.” He gambled his way across Monte Carlo and
Biarritz, and, in a bid to right his capsized finances,
speculated in stocks just as the American market reached its
vertiginous Jazz Age heights. For Churchill personally, out of
office for most of the 1930s, Britain’s declaration of war on
Germany in September of 1939 came as a kind of perverse relief.
He had been a vehement critic of the government’s policy of
appeasement, and now—his assessment of Hitler vindicated—he
could return, finally, to the seat of power. For a man who had
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy in the 1930s, in debt to the
tune of as much as $3.75 million in today’s money, a place in
the cabinet also bought him precious time with his creditors.
Eventually the government would even pick up a portion of his
liquor bill.
Churchill bought fine shirts and boxes of cigars—and
pink-silk underclothes—that he couldn’t afford. (Ullstein
Bild / Getty)
The money troubles—and
solutions—that preoccupied Churchill, an aristocrat who cut his
political teeth in a plutocratic age, make for spicy reading in
our own increasingly plutocratic times. Throughout his political
career, he relied upon rich acquaintances to bail him out. After
he lost his seat in Parliament in 1922, he engaged in dubious
lobbying on behalf of oil companies. He stretched all available
loopholes to avoid paying taxes, even (and especially) when he
served as chancellor of the Exchequer, the head of Great
Britain’s Treasury, from 1924 to 1929. And in the end, he made
his fortune by taking advantage of papers commandeered from
government files to construct his blockbuster memoirs.
Such chicanery is distressingly familiar these days, but it
is also different. As Lough points out, Churchill’s conduct
would hardly have met “the standards of transparency expected of
today’s politicians.” Some of Churchill’s financial bounty came
in the unlaundered (or lightly laundered) form of direct gifts
and loans. Take the 1940 crisis when the shirtmaker presented
his bill. The prime minister was saved by a discreet payment
amounting to nearly $375,000 in today’s money, from a
foreign-born financier, conveyed in a check written to someone
else and endorsed over to Churchill.
Haberdashery subsidies may seem both quaint and crude in the
era of mega-donors and super PACs.
And yet one basic question remains the same. What do you get in
return when you furnish a library in a politician’s house, as
one of Churchill’s friends did when he was a junior government
minister? Or when you pay a former secretary of state and likely
presidential contender hundreds of thousands of dollars to give
a canned speech? Churchill’s example suggests that in such
situations, just who is the player—and who is being played—can
be a trickier matter than it may first seem.
For a man
spending money he didn’t have, Churchill had one big advantage.
Most people assumed, given his flagrant style, that he was rich.
In truth, he wasn’t born to a great fortune, nor did he marry
into one. Churchill’s father, Randolph, was a younger son, and
the family’s Blenheim estate was in any case seriously reduced.
Churchill’s American mother, Jennie, was no Downton Abbey–style
heiress but a spendthrift outfitted with a
smaller-than-advertised dowry. When Jennie married a second
time, in 1900, after Lord Randolph’s death, her new husband
obligingly took a stack of her unpaid bills to deal with on
their honeymoon, but objected that it was “a bit thick” that he
was expected to pay for the carriage his predecessor had
purchased in the 1880s. Though Churchill’s family talked of him
marrying an heiress, when he finally did wed, at the age of 33,
it was for love. His wife, Clementine, was well born but poverty
stricken; before her marriage she worked as a seamstress and
taught French to earn her keep.
Neither the army (Churchill’s first career) nor politics
could come close to satisfying his need for money. In an era
before Goldman Sachs and General Mills were willing to pay
munificently for a politician’s speechifying, only by writing
did Churchill have a shot at staying afloat. In 1930, Churchill
pumped out more than 40 articles and in addition pledged to his
publishers that he would finish three books posthaste. Hit by a
car in New York City the following year, he cabled his agent
that he could “produce literary gem about 2,400 words” about the
accident. Churchill had to turn every thought, every experience,
into words and cash, an imperative that, as the historian
Jonathan Rose has recently argued, only exaggerated his
propensity to cast himself as a hero on the world stage.
Had the Churchills made their home in a more modest dwelling,
as Clementine apparently wanted, rather than the money pit
Chartwell (which Winston purchased on the sly when she was laid
up after the birth of their fifth child), his income would have
been sufficient to maintain the family in style. But as a wage
earner who kept company with rentiers, Churchill insisted on
grandeur. Bespoke shirts, oyster-and-pheasant dinners, and
nights in Monte Carlo casinos required him to find less
middle-class ways of raising cash.
The most
controversial of Churchill’s associations, both at the
time and since, was with bankers and businessmen of Jewish
origin, among them Sir Ernest Cassel and Sir Henry Strakosch.
Early in Churchill’s career, Cassel paid to furnish the library
in Churchill’s new house; after the First World War, he engaged
in subterfuge to take a costly real-estate blunder off
Churchill’s hands, claiming falsely that Churchill had acquired
the property on his behalf. It was the Austrian-born Strakosch
who kept Churchill from bankruptcy in 1938 and again in 1940,
when the shirtmaker demanded his fee. The Nazis liked to claim
that Churchill was in the pocket of Jewish financiers, a charge
that the Holocaust denier David Irving has since contemptibly
repeated. Lough, a banker himself, who doggedly pursues the ins
and outs of Churchill’s finances in No More Champagne,
argues that Strakosch sought nothing in return for his
payments—and received nothing, save an invitation to membership
in the dining society to which Churchill belonged. “There was no
other reward.” Churchill’s out-of-office lobbying on behalf of a
deal for the oil companies ultimately went nowhere too; as soon
as he had the chance to get back into government, he ditched the
assignment (but kept the money), and the deal fell apart. Nor
did Churchill give special favors to Cassel, though as
contemporary money-grubbing politicians discover, the appearance
of impropriety can prove damaging on its own. During Churchill’s
1923 campaign for reelection to Parliament, socialists hectored
him: “What about the 50,000 quid Cassel gave you?”
Positions can be bought or influenced, of course, but as in
the case of Churchill, big money can also flow to a political
figure simply because he or she is already backing the cause the
donor supports. Strakosch was willing to help Churchill not
because he saw a personal gain in the arrangement but because he
thought him the only politician in Europe capable of standing up
to Hitler. The bona fides of this transaction, though hardly an
argument in favor of money in politics, do serve as a reminder
that sometimes the suspicious financial smoke comes only from a
cigar. Churchill was in any case too much of a loose cannon to
be aimed. He was also too high-handed to view bailouts as
anything but his due. And apart from the complaints of a few
socialist agitators, his presumed wealth largely insulated him
from the charges of corruption that dogged self-made politicians
like his predecessor David Lloyd George.
Churchill started 1938 nearly bankrupt, but by the time he
left office in 1945, he was a rich man. More than any political
gift, it was a series of film deals that saved him, enabling him
to pay back some of the money he owed Strakosch. Selling the
film rights to his biography Marlborough: His Life and Times
proved particularly lucrative; so did his arrangement with the
producer and director Alexander Korda, who bought the rights to,
of all things, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples.
And the prospect of publishing his wartime memoirs was never far
from the prime minister’s mind, not even as German bombs
devastated British cities. Churchill instructed his private
secretaries during the Blitz to gather up boxes of his official
papers every month and mark them as “Personal Minutes.” (Even
her worst enemies don’t accuse Hillary Clinton of a maneuver
like that.)
After the war, he took 68 bundles of state papers home with
him. To his successor, Clement Attlee, Churchill explained that
he needed the documents to recount “the British war story.” “I
am convinced,” he told Attlee’s emissary, “it would be to the
advantage of our country to have it told, as perhaps I alone can
tell it.” The old alchemy of turning experiences into words
would at last yield blockbuster-size cash. Churchill’s Second
World War set a global record for a nonfiction-publishing
deal: $27.5 million in today’s money.
Peter Padfield, maritime historian who sailed across the Atlantic on a
replica of the Pilgrim ship the Mayflower – obituary.html
In Hess, Hitler & Churchill (2013) he challenged official accounts of
Hess’s flight, claiming that Churchill’s moral imperative for continuing the
war after the fall of France – when other British statesmen would have
agreed to the peace deal that Hess undoubtedly, in Padfield’s view, brought
from Hitler – had led to a cover-up.
In 1960 Peter Padfield married Jane Yarwood, with whom he moved to
Suffolk, where he supplemented his income by founding a company to sell
sketches of East Anglian scenes. He bought a gaff-rigged replica of a 1900
Norfolk shrimper which he sailed on the River Deben, and enjoyed bi-annual
holidays in Switzerland.
The Great Naval Race (1976), about the naval armaments race before the First
World War, sparked an interest in German history which led him to write
three biographies of Nazi leaders: Dönitz: The Last Führer (1984); Himmler:
Reichsführer-SS (1990) and Hess: Flight for the Führer (1991), the last
updated with new material as Hess: The Führer’s Disciple (1993).
Patrick J. Buchanan was a senior adviser to three American
presidents; ran twice for the Republican presidential nomination, in
1992 and 1996; and was the Reform Party candidate in 2000. He is the
author of nine other books, including the bestsellers Right from the
Beginning; A Republic, Not an Empire; The Death of the West; State of
Emergency; and Day of Reckoning. He is now a senior political
analyst for MSNBC.
[T]he Queen cannot help feeling that our isolation is dangerous.1
—Queen Victoria, January 14, 1896
Isolation is much less dangerous than the danger of being dragged into
wars which do not concern us.2
—Lord Salisbury, 1896
For as long as he had served the queen, Lord Salisbury had sought to
keep Britain free of power blocs. “His policy was not one of isolation
from Europe . . . but isolation from the Europe of alliances.”3
Britannia would rule the waves but stay out of Europe’s quarrels. Said
Salisbury, “We are fish.”4
When the queen called him to form a new government for the third time in
1895, Lord Salisbury pursued his old policy of “splendid isolation.” But
in the years since he and Disraeli had traveled to the Congress of
Berlin in 1878, to create with Bismarck a new balance of power in
Europe, their world had vanished.
In the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95, Japan defeated China, seized
Taiwan, and occupied the Liaotung Peninsula. Britain’s preeminent
position in China was now history.
In the summer of 1895, London received a virtual ultimatum from
secretary of state Richard Olney, demanding that Great Britain accept
U.S. arbitration in a border dispute between British Guiana and
Venezuela. Lord Salisbury shredded Olney’s note like an impatient
tenured professor cutting up a freshman term paper. But President
Cleveland demanded that Britain accept arbitration—or face the prospect
of war with the United States.
The British were stunned by American enthusiasm for a war over a patch
of South American jungle, and incredulous. America deployed two
battleships to Britain’s forty-four.5 Yet Salisbury took the threat
seriously: “A war with America . . . in the not distant future has
become something more than a possibility.”6
London was jolted anew in January 1896 when the Kaiser sent a telegram
of congratulations to Boer leader Paul Kruger on his capture of the
Jameson raiders, who had invaded the Transvaal in a land grab concocted
by Cecil Rhodes, with the connivance of Colonial Secretary Joseph
Chamberlain.
These two challenges, from a jingoistic America that was now the first
economic power on earth, and from his bellicose nephew in Berlin,
Wilhelm II, revealed to the future Edward VII that “his country was
without a friend in the world” and “steps to end British isolation were
required. . . .”7
On December 18, 1897, a Russian fleet steamed into the Chinese harbor of
Port Arthur, “obliging British warships to vacate the area.”8 British
jingoes “became apoplectic.”9 Lord Salisbury stood down: “I don’t think
we carry enough guns to fight them and the French together.”10
In 1898, a crisis erupted in northeast Africa. Captain Jean-Baptiste
Marchand, who had set off from Gabon in 1897 on a safari across the
Sahara with six officers and 120 Senegalese, appeared at Fashoda in the
southern Sudan, where he laid claim to the headwaters of the Nile. Sir
Herbert Kitchener cruised upriver to instruct Marchand he was on
imperial land. Faced with superior firepower, Marchand withdrew. Fashoda
brought Britain and France to the brink of war. Paris backed down, but
bitterness ran deep. Caught up in the Anglophobia was eight-year-old
Charles de Gaulle.11
In 1900, the Russian challenge reappeared. After American, British,
French, German, and Japanese troops had marched to the rescue of the
diplomatic legation in Peking, besieged for fifty-five days by Chinese
rebels called “Boxers,” Russia exploited the chaos to send a 200,000-man
army into Manchuria and the Czar shifted a squadron of his Baltic fleet
to Port Arthur. The British position in China was now threatened by
Russia and Japan.
But what awakened Lord Salisbury to the depth of British isolation was
the Boer War. When it broke out in 1899, Europeans and Americans cheered
British defeats. While Joe Chamberlain might “speak of the British
enjoying a ‘splendid isolation, surrounded and supported by our
kinsfolk,’ the Boer War brought home the reality that, fully extended in
their imperial role, the British needed to avoid conflict with the other
great powers.”12
Only among America’s Anglophile elite could Victoria’s nation or
Salisbury’s government find support. When Bourke Cockran, a Tammany Hall
Democrat, wrote President McKinley, urging
him to mediate and keep America’s distance from Great Britain’s “wanton
acts of aggression,” the letter went to Secretary of State John Hay.13
Hay bridled at this Celtic insolence. “Mr. Cockran’s logic is especially
Irish,” he wrote to a friend. “As long as I stay here no action shall be
taken contrary to my conviction that the one indispensable feature of
our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England.” Hay
refused even to answer “Bourke Cockran’s fool letter to the
president.”14
Hay spoke of an alliance with Britain as an “unattainable dream” and
hoped for a smashing imperial victory in South Africa. “I hope if it
comes to blows that England will make quick work of Uncle Paul
[Kruger].”15
Entente Cordiale
So it was that as the nineteenth century came to an end Britain set out
to court old rivals. The British first reached out to the Americans.
Alone among Europe’s great powers, Britain sided with the United States
in its 1898 war with Spain. London then settled the Alaska boundary
dispute in America’s favor, renegotiated the fifty-year-old
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and ceded to America the exclusive rights to
build, operate, and fortify a canal across Panama. Then Britain withdrew
her fleet from the Caribbean.
Writes British historian Correlli Barnett: “The passage of the British
battlefleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific would now be by courtesy of
the United States,” and, with America’s defeat of Spain, “The
Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, now American colonies, were gradually
closed to British merchants by protective tariffs, for the benefit of
their American rivals.”16
Other historians, however, hail the British initiative to terminate a
century of U.S.-British enmity as “The Great Rapprochement,” and
Berlin-born Yale historian Hajo Holborn regards the establishment of
close Anglo-American relations as probably “by far the greatest
achievement of British diplomacy in terms of world history.”17
With America appeased, Britain turned to Asia.
With a Russian army in Manchuria menacing Korea and the Czar’s warships
at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, Japan needed an ally to balance off
Russia’s ally, France. Germany would not do, as Kaiser Wilhelm disliked
Orientals and was endlessly warning about the “Yellow Peril.” As for the
Americans, their Open Door policy had proven to be bluster and bluff
when Russia moved into Manchuria. That left the British, whom the
Japanese admired as an island people and warrior race that had created
the world’s greatest empire.
On January 30, 1902, an Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed. Each nation
agreed to remain neutral should the other become embroiled in an Asian
war with a single power. However, should either become involved in war
with two powers, each would come to the aid of the other. Confident its
treaty with Britain would checkmate Russia’s ally France, Japan in 1904
launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval squadron at Port Arthur.
An enraged Czar sent his Baltic fleet to exact retribution. After a
voyage of six months from the Baltic to the North Sea, down the Atlantic
and around the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean, the great Russian
fleet was ambushed and annihilated by Admiral Heihachiro Togo in
Tshushima Strait between Korea and Japan. Only one small Russian cruiser
and two destroyers made it to Vladivostok. Japan lost two torpedo boats.
It was a victory for Japan to rival the sinking of the Spanish Armada
and the worst defeat ever inflicted on a Western power by an Asian
people.
Britain had chosen well. In 1905, the Anglo-Japanese treaty was elevated
into a full alliance. Britain now turned to patching up quarrels with
her European rivals. Her natural allies were Germany and the Habsburg
Empire, neither of whom had designs on the British Empire. Imperial
Russia, Britain’s great nineteenth-century rival, was pressing down on
China, India, Afghanistan, the Turkish Straits, and the Middle East.
France was Britain’s ancient enemy and imperial rival in Africa and
Egypt. The nightmare of the British was a second Tilsit, where Napoleon
and Czar Alexander I, meeting on a barge in the Neiman in 1807, had
divided a prostrate Europe and Middle East between them. Germany was the
sole European bulwark against a French-Russian dominance of Europe and
drive for hegemony in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—at the expense
of the British Empire.
With Lord Salisbury’s blessing, Joe Chamberlain began to court Berlin.
“England, Germany and America should collaborate: by so doing they could
check Russian expansionism, calm turbulent France and guarantee world
peace,” Chamberlain told future German chancellor Bernhard von Bulow.18
The Kaiser put him off. Neither he nor his advisers believed Britain
could reconcile with her old nemesis France, or Russia, and must
eventually come to Berlin hat-in-hand. Joe warned the Germans: Spurn
Britain, and we go elsewhere.
The Kaiser let the opportunity slip and, in April 1904, learned to his
astonishment that Britain and France had negotiated an entente cordiale,
a cordial understanding. France yielded all claims in Egypt, and Britain
agreed to support France’s preeminence in Morocco. Centuries of
hostility came to an end. The quarrel over Suez was over. Fashoda was
history.
The entente quickly proved its worth. After the Kaiser was persuaded to
make a provocative visit to Tangier in 1905, Britain backed France at
the Algeciras conference called to resolve the crisis. Germany won
economic concessions in Morocco, but Berlin had solidified the
Anglo-French entente. More ominous, the Tangier crisis had propelled
secret talks already under way between French and British staff officers
over how a British army might be ferried across the Channel to France in
the event of a war with Germany.
Unknown to the Cabinet and Parliament, a tiny cabal had made a decision
fateful for Britain, the empire, and the world. Under the guidance of
Edward Grey, the foreign secretary from 1905 to 1916, British and French
officers plotted Britain’s entry into a Franco-German war from the first
shot. And these secret war plans were being formulated by Liberals voted
into power in public revulsion against the Boer War on a platform of
“Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform.” Writes historian Robert Massie,
[O]n January 16 [1906], without the approval of either the Prime
Minister or Cabinet, secret talks between British and French staff
officers began. They focussed on plans to send 100,000 British soldiers
to the Continent within two weeks of an outbreak of hostilities. On
January 26, when Campbell-Bannerman returned to London and was informed,
he approved.19
As Churchill wrote decades later, only Lord Rosebery read the real
meaning of the Anglo-French entente. “Only one voice—Rosebery’s—was
raised in discord: in public ‘Far more likely to lead to War than
Peace’; in private ‘Straight to War.’ ”20 While praising Rosebery’s
foresight, Churchill never repudiated his own support of the entente or
secret understandings: “It must not be thought that I regret the
decisions which were in fact taken.”21
In August 1907, Britain entered into an Anglo-Russian convention, ending
their eighty-year conflict. Czar Nicholas II accepted Britain’s
dominance in southern Persia. Britain accepted Russia’s dominance in the
north. Both agreed to stay out of central Persia, Afghanistan, and
Tibet. The Great Game was over and the lineups completed for the great
European war. In the Triple Alliance were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Italy. Opposite was the Franco-Russian alliance backed by Great Britain,
which was allied to Japan. Only America among the great powers remained
free of entangling alliances.
“You Have a New World”
Britain had appeased America, allied with Japan, and entered an entente
with France and Russia, yet its German problem remained. It had arisen
in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war. After the French defeat at
Sedan and the abdication of Napoleon III, a united Germany stretching
from France to Russia and from the Baltic to the Alps had emerged as the
first power in Europe. Disraeli recognized the earthshaking importance
of the unification of the German states under a Prussian king.
The war represents the German revolution, a greater political event than
the French revolution of the last century. . . . There is not a
diplomatic tradition, which has not been swept away. You have a new
world. . . . The balance of power has been entirely destroyed.22
Bismarck had engineered the wars on Denmark, Austria, and France, but he
now believed his nation had nothing to gain from war. She had “hay
enough for her fork.”23 Germany should not behave “like a nouveau riche
who has just come into money and then offended everyone by pointing to
the coins in his pocket.”24 He crafted a series of treaties to maintain
a European balance of power favorable to Germany—by keeping the
Austro-Hungarian Empire allied, Russia friendly, Britain neutral, and
France isolated. Bismarck opposed the building of a fleet that might
alarm the British. As for an overseas empire, let Britain, France, and
Russia quarrel over colonies. When a colonial adventurer pressed upon
him Germany’s need to enter the scramble for Africa, Bismarck replied,
“Your map of Africa is very nice. But there is France, and here is
Russia, and we are in the middle, and that is my map of Africa.”25
As the clamor for colonies grew, however, the Iron Chancellor would
succumb and Germany would join the scramble. By 1914, Berlin boasted the
world’s third largest overseas empire, encompassing German East Africa
(Tanganyika), South-West Africa (Namibia), Kamerun (Cameroon), and
Togoland. On the China coast, the Kaiser held Shantung Peninsula. In the
western Pacific, the House of Hohenzollern held German New Guinea,
German Samoa, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall, Mariana, and
Caroline islands, and the Northern Solomons, of which Bougainville was
the largest. However, writes Holborn,
Not for a moment were Bismarck’s colonial projects intended to
constitute a revision of the fundamentals of his continental policy.
Least of all were they designs to undermine British naval or colonial
supremacy overseas. Bismarck was frank when he told British statesmen
that Germany, by the acquisition of colonies, was giving Britain new
hostages, since she could not hope to defend them in an emergency.26
By 1890, Bismarck had been dismissed by the new young Kaiser, who began
to make a series of blunders, the first of which was to let Bismarck’s
treaty with Russia lapse. This left Russia nowhere to turn but France.
By 1894, St. Petersburg had become the ally of a Paris still seething
over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. France had broken free of the
isolation imposed upon her by Bismarck. The Kaiser’s folly in letting
the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia lapse can hardly be overstated.
While Germany was a “satiated power, so far as Europe itself was
concerned, and stood to gain little from a major war on the European
continent,” France and Russia were expansionist.27 Paris hungered for
the return of Alsace. Russia sought hegemony over Bulgaria, domination
of the Turkish Straits to keep foreign warships out of the Black Sea,
and to pry away the Austrian share of a partitioned Poland.
More ominous, the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 stipulated that a
partial mobilization by any member of the Triple Alliance—Austria,
Italy, or Germany—would trigger hostilities against all three.28 As
George Kennan writes in The Fateful Alliance,
A partial Austrian mobilization against Serbia, for example (and one has
only to recall the events of 1914 to understand the potential
significance of this circumstance) could alone become the occasion for
the launching of a general Eu
Out of government during his so-called "wilderness
years" in the 1930s, Churchill took the lead in calling for British
rearmament to counter the growing threat of
militarism in
Nazi Germany. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was
re-appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. In May 1940, he became Prime
Minister, replacing
Neville Chamberlain. Churchill oversaw British involvement in the
Allied war effort against the
Axis
powers, resulting in
victory in 1945. After the Conservatives' defeat in the
1945 general election, he became
Leader of the Opposition. Amid the developing
Cold War
with the
Soviet Union, he publicly warned of an "iron
curtain" of Soviet influence in Europe and promoted European unity. He
lost the
1950 election, but was returned to office the following year in the
1951 election. His
second term was preoccupied with foreign affairs, especially
Anglo-American relations and the preservation of the British Empire.
Domestically, his government emphasised house-building and completed the
development of a nuclear weapon (begun by his predecessor). In declining
health, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister in 1955, although he remained
an MP until
1964. Upon his death in 1965, he received a
state funeral.
Widely considered one of the 20th century's most significant figures,
Churchill remains popular in the UK and Western world, where he is seen as a
victorious wartime leader who played an important role in defending Europe's
liberal democracy against the spread of
fascism.
He is also praised as a social reformer. However, he has been criticised for
some wartime events – notably the
area bombing of German cities and his government's response to the
Bengal famine – and also for his imperialist views, including
comments on race.
Winston Churchill refused to pay his tailor's bills
QUOTE
LONDON (Reuters) - Refusal to pay the bills of one’s tailor was famously
almost a point of honour among English gentlemen in past centuries and
Winston Churchill was no exception, newly released archives show.
Britain’s
World War Two leader had racked up a bill of 197 pounds by 1937 - around
12,000 pounds at today’s prices - with Savile Row tailor Henry Poole and
Co before he was finally asked to pay up.
He took
offence, refused to settle the bill and never darkened Poole’s door
again.
Despite the
arrears, the tailor had continued to make clothes for Churchill, said
James Sherwood, a historian who has examined Poole and Co’s archives.
“Churchill
said it was for morale, it was good for us [Henry Poole] to dress him
and he wasn’t aware we were short of cash. He never did pay, and never
came back – he never forgave us,” Sherwood added on Poole’s website.
Churchill,
who led the British government during the war and again in the 1950s,
was in exalted company when it came to not settling tailors’ bills.
The son of
author Charles Dickens, for example, ran up a bill with Poole which
eventually had to be paid by his father.
When he was
prince of Wales in the 1870s, King Edward VII, made “infrequent payments
on account that accumulated over years”. When a bill was eventually sent
to the prince, he withdrew his custom and only came back 20 years later
when he became king.
Other famous
- and better behaved - customers of the tailor included author Bram
Stoker, Prussian Prime Minister Prince Otto von Bismarck, American
banker J.P. Morgan and Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, who was
visited in person by the tailors in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa.
When company
founder Henry Poole died, his high-profile clients owed him a huge
amount and the firm was in a bad financial situation, the archives show.
The last
surviving letter from Poole, written in 1875, said: “there will be
nothing much to leave behind me. I have worked for a prince and for the
public and must die a poor man.”
The
archives, which go back to 1865, have been dusted off, rebound and the
public can view them by appointment for the first time at Poole’s in
Savile Row, central London.
Reporting by Lisa Barrington; editing by Stephen Addison
Errors & omissions,
broken links, cock ups, over-emphasis, malice [ real or imaginary ] or whatever;
if you find any I am open to comment.
Email me at Mike
Emery.
All financial contributions are cheerfully accepted. If you want to keep it
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